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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
The 1956 Labour Relations Act1 (1956 LRA) allowed appeals from the Industrial Court to the 
former Labour Appeal Court (LAC).2 A further appeal could be made to the then Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court. The Industrial Court was not a court of law and as such, its 
proceedings were subject to review by the High Court (HC) or by the LAC. 
  
Appeals and reviews are ways of revising a decision generally by lower courts and arbitrations.3 
The reason for using one of these remedies is based upon dissatisfaction, for a variety of reasons, 
with the outcomes determined by the decision-maker.4 While sometimes conflated, appeal and 
review are two different remedies. It is trite that an arbitration award is usually final and binding. 
Accordingly, one cannot appeal against the award of an arbitrator in terms of the Labour 
Relations Act5 (LRA),6 nor can it be done in normal arbitration proceedings unless it has been 
agreed to between the parties. Even if a court is of the opinion that an award granted is incorrect, 
there are limited grounds upon which they are entitled to interfere.7  
 
When conducting an appeal, the court is obliged to consider the merits of the matter before it. 
The court must decide whether the decision of court a quo was right or wrong.8 The court will 
                                                 
1 Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. 
2 Grogan J Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution (2010) 321. 
3 Hoexter G Administration Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 108. 
4 Hoexter G Administration Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 108. 
5  Labour Relations Act No 66 of 1995 
6 National Union of Mineworkers & Another v Samancor Ltd (Tubatse Ferrochme) & other (2011) 32 ILJ 1618 
(SCA); [2011] 11 BLLR 1041 para 5. 
7 National Union of Mineworkers & Another v Samancor Ltd (Tubatse Ferrochme) & other (2011) 32 ILJ 1618 
(SCA); [2011] 11 BLLR 1041 para 5. 
8 Fergus E ‘The distinction between appeal and reviews – Defining the limits of the labour court’s powers of    
review’ (2010) 31 ILJ 1556-1557. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
have to decide whether the decision was right or wrong on the facts or the law.9 In essence, an 
appeal court looks at an issue for a second time.  
 
In contrast to above, in terms of a review, the courts do not decide whether a decision is correct 
or not. Instead, it must determine whether a gross irregularity occurred in the proceedings or if 
the manner in which the decision was reached was fitting and reasonable, taking into account 
relevant circumstances.10 If a court determines that there was a substantial problem, the decision 
is effectively declared null and void. Great emphasis has been placed on the distinction between 
appeal and review and that this distinction must be maintained.11 Notwithstanding this, the 
distinction between these two remedies is not as clear in practice as in theory. Hoexter notes that 
the focus is often on the decision itself as opposed to the decision-making process when dealing 
with judicial reviews. Thus in some cases it will be impossible to separate the merits from the 
rest of the matter. It has been noted that courts are often unable to effectively judge the legality 
of the decision without considering the merits of the case as well.12 
 
The LRA excludes the remedy of appeals against arbitration awards. However, if a party is 
unhappy with the outcomes of the decision, such a party can request the court to review the 
decision of the commissioner. The reason for the exclusion of an appeal from the arbitrator’s 
award of unfair dismissal is to speed up the process and free it from the legalism and cost that 
accompanies appeal proceedings.13  
 
Section 145(2) of the LRA14 provides for the grounds upon which an unhappy party is able to 
challenge an arbitration award. In terms of the section, an award can be set aside on the grounds 
                                                 
9 Hoexter G Administration Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 108. 
10 Fergus E ‘The distinction between appeal and reviews – Defining the limits of the labour court’s powers of 
review’ (2010) 31 ILJ 1556-1557. 
11 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and others 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) 
para 45;  Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2007 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) para 108, 244;  
Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO. & others 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) para 32. 
12 Hoexter G Administration Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 110; Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO. & others 
1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) para 36; Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2007 12 BLLR 
1097 (CC) para 108. 
13 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Labour Relations Act 1995 16 ILJ 278-318. 
14 Labour Relations Act No 66 of 1995. 
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of misconduct, gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings, the commissioner 
has exceeded his or her power, and the award has been improperly obtained.15  
 
The drafters of the LRA did not see it fit to confer a right of appeal from proceedings of the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) and bargaining councils.16 
Reviews conducted by the Labour Court (LC) under the LRA or the Arbitration Act17 are subject 
to further appeal to the LAC.18 When dealing with an appeal on a matter from a reviewing court. 
Courts must bear in mind that the issue on appeal remains whether the arbitrator committed 
reviewable misconduct.19   
 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION  
 
Is the standard of reasonableness as expressed in Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum 
Mines Ltd & others 2007 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) an appropriate mechanism for reviewing arbitral 
awards?  
 
1.3 THE TEST FOR REVIEW APPLIED BY THE COURTS AFTER SIDUMO V 
RUSTENBURG PLATINUM MINES 
 
In Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others20 a security guard was tasked 
with guarding a high risk security point but was dismissed on the basis that he repeatedly 
neglected to search, either properly or at all, employees exiting the security point. Sidumo 
requested the CCMA to arbitrate an unfair dismissal dispute. The commissioner concluded that 
Sidumo was guilty of misconduct, but that dismissal was not an appropriate or fair sanction. 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines applied to the LC to review the decision of the arbitrator and 
appealed to the LAC, but was unsuccessful on both occasions.21  
 
                                                 
15 Section 145(2)(a)-(b) of the LRA. 
16 Grogan J Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution (2010) 321. 
17 Arbitration Act 42 of 1965. 
18 Grogan J Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution (2010) 321. 
19 Grogan J Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution (2010) 309. 
20 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2007 12 BLLR. 
21 Rustenburg Platinum mines Ltd v CCMA & others [2004] 1 BLLR 34 (LAC) para 12-13. 
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A further appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) resulted in the court overturning both 
the decisions of the previous courts and the commissioner’s finding being replaced with a ruling 
that the dismissal was fair. The SCA held that a CCMA commissioner does not have authority in 
relations to sanction, but bears the duty of deciding whether the employer’s sanction is fair.22 
The court went on to state that a commissioner opining that a different sanction would be fairer 
does not warrant setting aside the employer’s sanction.23 The SCA further held that CCMA 
arbitration awards amount to administrative actions and are accordingly reviewable under the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act24 (PAJA).  The court was of the view point that PAJA 
incorporated the grounds of review in section 145(2) of the LRA, replacing the specialised 
enactment of the LRA.25  
 
The matter was appealed to the CC, where the court had to determine the issue of how 
commissioners should approach the task of determining the fairness of a dismissal.26 In rejecting 
the ‘reasonable employer’ test, the CC held that27:  
‘The Constitution and the LRA seek to redress the power imbalance between 
employees and employers… Neither the Constitution nor the LRA affords any 
preferential status to the employer’s view on the fairness of a dismissal… The 
approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal tilts the balance against employees.’ 
 
On the question of review, the majority held that the standard is suffused by the constitutional 
standard of reasonableness.28 Reviewing courts will have to determine whether the decision 
reached by the commissioner is one a reasonable decision-maker could have reached.29 The CC 
criticised the SCA’s approach to CCMA arbitration awards being reviewable under PAJA. The 
court held that the SCA had not sufficiently referred to section 33 of the Constitution30 when 
examining the functions of the commissioner, nor did it examine whether PAJA ‘provided an 
exclusive statutory basis for the review of all administrative decisions.’31 Whereas a decision by 
                                                 
22 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 29. 
23 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 34. 
24 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
25 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 38. 
26 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 46 
27 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 74. 
28 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 110. 
29 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 110. 
30 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
31 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 80. 
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a commissioner could be an administrative action, it does not mean that PAJA is automatically 
applicable to the review of the CCMA arbitration awards.32  In this regard, it was held that33: 
‘To answer this question it is necessary first to deal with the LRA and its applicable 
provisions in relation to PAJA. The LRA is [a] specialised negotiated national legislation
 
giving effect to the right to fair labour practices…. The task team was tasked to ‘provide a 
system of labour courts to determine disputes of right in a way that would be accessible, 
speedy, and inexpensive, with only one tier of appeal’…. Section 145 was purposefully 
designed, as was the entire dispute resolution framework of the LRA. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal was of the view that the only tension in relation to the importation of PAJA was the 
difference in time-scales in relation to reviews under section 145 of the LRA and PAJA. This 
difference is but one symptom of a lack of cohesion between provisions of the LRA and 
PAJA.’ 
 
It was held that when PAJA was enacted the legislature had knowledge of sections 145 and 21034 
of the LRA and did not repeal these sections.35 Therefore the SCA had erred in holding that 
PAJA applied to arbitration awards in terms of the LRA.  
 
The Constitutional Court in Sidumo gave very little guidance as to how the standard of 
reasonableness should be applied in practice.36 It is noted that the standard of reasonableness 
threatens the distinction between appeal and review, as it is not often possible to separate the 
merits from scrutiny yet the court held that this distinction should be maintained.37 The court 
further held that a reviewing court is obliged not to determine whether the decision by the 
arbitrator is correct but to determine whether a gross irregularity occurred during the 
proceedings.38 Where a commissioner has failed to take into consideration material facts, the 
arbitration proceedings cannot be fair because the commissioner failed to perform in terms of 
                                                 
32 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 94. 
33 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 94-
95. 
34 If any conflict, relating to the matters dealt with in this Act, arises between this Act and the provisions of any 
other law save the Constitution or any act expressly amending this Act, the provisions of this Act will prevail. 
35 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 103. 
36 Fergus E From Sidumo to Dunsmuir: The Test for Review of CCMA Arbitration Awards (unpublished LLD 
Thesis, University of Cape Town, 2013) 14. 
37 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2007 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) para 108, 244. 
38 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2007 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) para 244. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
their stated duty and functions.39 The conduct of the commissioner accordingly prevents the 
aggrieved party from having his or her case fully and fairly determined, which constitutes gross 
irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings as envisioned in section 145(2)(a)(ii) of 
the LRA.40 
 
In Herholdt v Nedbank41 a financial broker employed by Nedbank was dismissed on the grounds 
that he dishonestly failed to declare a conflict of interest. This interest arose from him being 
nominated as a beneficiary in the will of a dying client. The employee was found not guilty of 
misconduct and reinstated in a CCMA arbitration award. Nedbank was successful in reviewing 
the award in the LC. The employee subsequently unsuccessfully appealed to both the LAC and 
SCA. The SCA in Herholdt held that the position after the Constitutional Court judgment in 
Sidumo with regards to review of arbitration awards should have been clear, but instead there has 
been a development in a different direction with regards to the review standard.42 The new 
development provides a more generous standard for reviewing arbitration awards.43 This 
standard states that an arbitration award can be set aside on review on the ground of a latent 
irregularity as opposed to a gross irregularity which occurred during the proceedings.44 A latent 
irregularity requires one to look at the reasons not to determine whether the result is correct but 
in essence to determine whether a gross irregularity had occurred in the proceedings.45 This 
would then occur where the arbitrator has failed to take into account material facts or took into 
account immaterial facts.46 
 
Courts have held that there are two types of unreasonableness.47 An award would be reviewable 
if it suffers either from dialectical unreasonableness or if it is substantively unreasonable in its 
                                                 
39 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 268. 
40 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 268. 
41 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd [2012] 9 BLLR 857 (LAC) para 1-6. 
42 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 14. 
43 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 15. 
44 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 16. 
45 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 264. 
46 Rogers P & Naidu C ‘Test for review relooked – is there still scope for process related review or is it limited to 
Sidumo’s outcome-based approach?’ http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=63b12c19-a56a-4a12-8f31-
9b05de51fff5  (accessed 28 October 2014). 
47 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd [2012] 9 BLLR 857 (LAC) para 33. See also Myburg A ‘The LAC's Latest Trilogy of 
Review Judgments: Is the Sidumo Test in Decline?’ (2013) 34 ILJ 19 26. 
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outcomes.48 Substantive unreasonableness, which is the test used in Sidumo requires the 
aggrieved party to not only establish that the commissioner’s reasons are unreasonable, but also 
that there existed no good reasons given the evidence before the commissioner to justify the 
award.49 Dialectical unreasonableness is unreasonableness which flows from the process of 
reasoning adopted by the arbitrator.50 The question facing the reviewing court is whether the 
decision ‘is supported by arguments and considerations recognised as valid, even if not 
conclusive.’51 If a decision-maker fails to take account of a relevant factor which he or she is 
bound to consider, the resulting decision will not be reasonable from a dialectical point of 
view.52 It is not a requirement that the ‘commissioner must have deprived the aggrieved party of 
a fair trial by misconceiving the whole nature of the enquiry.’53 Instead, the threshold of 
interference is much lower, as it is sufficient to show that the commissioner has failed to apply 
his mind to certain material facts or issues before him, creating the potential for prejudice and the 
possibility that the result may have been different.54 The SCA in Herholdt55 held that this 
approach is based on the dictum by Ngcobo J in New Clicks a Constitutional Court judgment,56 
which reads as follows:  
 
‘There is obviously an overlap between the ground of review based on failure to take into 
consideration a relevant factor and one based on the unreasonableness of the decision. A 
consideration of the factors that a decision-maker is bound to take into account is essential to 
a reasonable decision. If a decision-maker fails to take into account a factor that he or she is 
bound to take into consideration, the resulting decision can hardly be said to be that of a 
reasonable decision-maker.’57 
 
                                                 
48 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd [2012] 9 BLLR 857 (LAC) para 33. 
49 Myburgh A ‘The LAC's Latest Trilogy of Review Judgments: Is the Sidumo Test in Decline?’ (2013) 34 ILJ 19 
23. 
50 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 22. 
51 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd [2012] 9 BLLR 857 (LAC) para 33. 
52 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd [2012] 9 BLLR 857 (LAC) para 36. 
53 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd [2012] 9 BLLR 857 (LAC) para  39. 
54 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd [2012] 9 BLLR 857 (LAC) para 39. 
55 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 23. 
56 Minister of Health & another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd & others (Treatment Action Campaign & 
another as Amici Curiae) 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC). 
57 Minister of Health & another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd & others (Treatment Action Campaign & 
another as Amici Curiae) 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) para 511. 
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This dictum expressly relates to the provisions of PAJA and the manner in which they are to be 
applied.58 However in accordance with Sidumo, PAJA does not apply to reviews under section 
145(2) of the LRA and is of no application to CCMA awards.59 In Herholdt60 the SCA held that 
when evaluating the reasoning of a CCMA arbitrator and determining the reasons given for 
making an award are not justifiable as such, its effect is to revive the decision in Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration,61 yet this decision was expressly overruled by the Constitutional Court in Sidumo.62 
Accordingly an arbitration award will only be unreasonable if it is one that a reasonable 
arbitrator could not reach on all the material before them.63 An award will not simply be set aside 
on (even material) errors of fact, including the weight and relevance attached to particular facts, 
unless the effect thereof is to render the outcome unreasonable.64 
 
Latent irregularity is often referred to as process related unreasonableness.65 Such irregularity 
arises from the failure by the arbitrator to take into account a material fact in determining the 
arbitration, as well as the converse situation of taking into account materially irrelevant facts.66 
The origin of this approach is a dictum in the minority judgment of Ngcobo J in the 
Constitutional Court judgment of Sidumo,67 where he stated that it is required of a commissioner 
to apply his or her mind to the issues that are material to the determination of the dispute in order 
for the proceedings to be fair. One of the duties of a commissioner when conducting arbitration 
is to determine the material facts. The commissioner must apply the provisions of the LRA to the 
facts in order to determine whether the dismissal was for a fair reason. He further holds that 
where a commissioner fails to apply their mind, it is impossible to say that there was a fair trial 
of issues. This threshold for intervention with the award is lower than the standard in the 
                                                 
58 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 24. 
59 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para  24. 
60 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 24. 
61 Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
2007 (1) SA 576 (SCA). 
62 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 24. 
63 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 25. 
64 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 25. 
65 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 16. 
66 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 16. 
67 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 267. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Constitutional Court majority judgment in Sidumo judgment68 and such an approach is contrary 
to the approach endorsed by the Constitutional Court majority judgment in Sidumo judgment for 
reviewing arbitration awards.69 
 
In the judgment of Murphy AJA of the LAC in Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd70 he opines that the time 
has arrived to rethink the remedy for a relief sought against an arbitration award. Justice for all 
may be better served were the relief against awards take the form of an appeal rather than a 
review. ‘Reviews, just like appeals, lead to records, lengthy proceedings, lawyers, legalism, 
inordinate delays and high cost.’71 He is of the opinion that the objective of simple, quick, cheap 
and non-legalistic approach to unfair dismissals appears to not have been achieved through the 
limitation of review on the grounds of reasonableness.72 Murphy AJ holds that it is far easier to 
determine whether a commissioner’s award is correct or incorrect on the facts or law, as opposed 
to determining whether a commissioner acted reasonably when making a decision.73  
 
The drafters of the LRA were deliberate in rejecting the possibility of appeals.74 They went as far 
as selecting the narrowest possible grounds of review as the basis upon which arbitration awards 
will be challenged. Yet these narrow grounds are disregarded by various courts. These courts 
have interpreted these provisions to provide a more generous standard of review that is more 
easily satisfied.75 By this generous standard parties will also not be deterrent to challenge 
arbitration awards. The overall aim of a speedy and inexpensive resolution of labour disputes is 
accordingly not always reached.  
 
1.4 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY  
 
The aim of the CC in Sidumo was to bring clarity with regards to the test for reviewing 
arbitration awards. Based on the above cases and commentaries there is an apparent development 
                                                 
68 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 17. 
69 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 20. 
70 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd [2012] 9 BLLR 857 (LAC) para 56. 
71 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd [2012] 9 BLLR 857 (LAC) para 53. 
72 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd [2012] 9 BLLR 857 (LAC) para 53. 
73 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd [2012] 9 BLLR 857 (LAC) para 54. 
74 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 9. 
75 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 11. 
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in a different direction with regards to the review test. The Constitutional Court in Sidumo 
required a review court to determine whether the decision by a commissioner was one a 
reasonable decision-maker could have reached on the evidential material available.76 Rogers and 
Naidu submit that this focus is largely based on the conclusion as opposed to the method in 
which the arbitrator arrived at the conclusion. They note that ‘a defective reasoning by an 
arbitrator still passes the muster required in reviews’ on condition that the result is one that a 
reasonable arbitrator could have reached. They further note that in various decisions the LC did 
not limit itself to this relatively narrow outcome-based approach. Instead, a process-related 
approach was developed, which the court treated as existing in parallel to the outcomes-based 
approach.  Process-related reviews allow for an arbitration award to be reviewed, even if the 
outcome of the award was one that a reasonable arbitrator could have reached, based on a 
determination that the process through which the award was reached was found to be materially 
wanting. 77   
 
The above approach was adopted by the LAC in the Herholdt judgment. The LAC in this case 
adopted a generous standard of review which is easily satisfied as opposed to the test determined 
in Sidumo by the Constitutional Court. The LAC indicated that the ground of review of gross 
irregularity in terms of section 145 (2)(a)(ii) of the LRA included latent irregularity and 
dialectical irregularity, as the bases for the review of an arbitration award. A reviewing court is 
required to consider the reasoning of the arbitrator, an approach far wider than the traditional 
approach to the concept of gross irregularity.78  
 
Myburgh is of the opinion that from a practical perspective Herholdt does not prevent process-
related reviews.79 In order for an award to be set aside on a process related review, he submits it 
                                                 
76 Rogers P & Naidu C ‘Test for review relooked – is there still scope for process related review or is it limited to 
Sidumo’s outcome-based approach?’ http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=63b12c19-a56a-4a12-8f31-
9b05de51fff5  (accessed 28 October 2014). 
77 Rogers P & Naidu C ‘Test for review relooked – is there still scope for process related review or is it limited to 
Sidumo’s outcome-based approach?’ http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=63b12c19-a56a-4a12-8f31-
9b05de51fff5  (accessed 28 October 2014). 
78 Rogers P & Naidu C ‘Test for review relooked – is there still scope for process related review or is it limited to 
Sidumo’s outcome-based approach?’ http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=63b12c19-a56a-4a12-8f31-
9b05de51fff5  (accessed 28 October 2014). 
79 Myburgh A ‘The test for review of CCMA arbitration awards: an update’ (2013) 23 Contemporary Labour Law 4 
42. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
must be established that the decision of the award had culminated in the result of the award being 
unreasonable.80 He notes that after the Constitutional Court judgment in Sidumo the LAC has set 
aside awards or confirmed their setting aside on review in numerous cases on the basis of 
process-related errors.81 These awards were found to be sufficient in themselves to be reviewed 
without the Sidumo test being met.82 Myburgh submits that Herholdt puts us back into the legal 
position we were immediately before the Constitutional Court judgment in Sidumo.83  
 
Where it can be established that the outcome of an award is objectively wrong, a review for want 
of reasonableness will more often than not succeed. The LAC in Herholdt adopted the minority 
view of Ngcobo J which relates to the provisions of PAJA, something which was expressly 
determined not to be relevant in the majority judgment of the Constitutional Court judgment in 
Sidumo. These subsequent judgments accordingly create confusion as to how reviews are 
effectively dealt with in practice by our labour courts. 
 
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
 
The research methodology will be in the form of a desk study. In terms of International Labour 
Organisation, there are no standards, which are directly relevant to the question at hand. Instead, 
a critically comparative analysis between the laws of South Africa, Canada, and Namibia with 
reference to the context of appeal and review in labour matters (and more specifically that of 
arbitration) shall be done. Case law interpreting the law and principles relating to appeals and 
reviews together with academic commentary, shall be critically analysed accordingly. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
80 Myburgh A ‘The test for review of CCMA arbitration awards: an update’ (2013) 23 Contemporary Labour Law 4 
42. 
81 Myburgh A ‘The test for review of CCMA arbitration awards: an update’ (2013) 23 Contemporary Labour Law 4 
42. 
82 Myburgh A ‘The test for review of CCMA arbitration awards: an update’ (2013) 23 Contemporary Labour Law 4 
42. 
83 Myburgh A ‘The test for review of CCMA arbitration awards: an update’ (2013) 23 Contemporary Labour Law 4 
42 
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1.6 NAMIBIAN’S JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
Namibia and South Africa have been recommended for implementing constitutions that 
guarantee the protection of basic labour rights and for undertaking labour reforms to give effect 
to constitutionally entrenched labour rights.84 The aim is to regulate all facets of labour 
relationships. The current Labour Act has considerably transformed the labour law in Namibia 
and shaped a new framework for the resolution of labour disputes.85 As opposed to the South 
African position, Namibia’s Labour Act86 permits for the remedies of appeal and review of an 
arbitration award.87 Section 89(1) of the Labour Act allows an appeal to the LC against an award 
on a question of fact or law. When applying for an appeal or review the LC must be clear on 
whether it is dealing with an appeal or undertaking a review.88 This is critical as appeal 
proceedings are different to review proceedings.89 
 
In Shoprite Namibia90 the appellant appealed against the arbitrator’s award based on the question 
of law. The appellant held that the arbitrator erred on the law or on the facts in her finding of the 
material facts. The court held that s 89(1) of the Labour Act states that one can only appeal an 
arbitration award on the question of law alone without anything else present, e.g. opinion or 
fact.91 In Mokwena92the applicant requested the setting aside of the award made by the arbitrator 
and referring the matter back for fresh conciliation and fresh arbitration. The court held that the 
review of arbitral awards is administered by s 89 (4) of the Labour Act, read with subsections (5) 
and (10). The court held that there are four different categories of judicial review.93 The first type 
of review is related to the irregularities and illegalities in the proceedings before the lower courts. 
The second category is expected to regulate proceedings before tribunals. The third category is 
expected to regulate acts of administrative bodies and administrative officials. Lastly, the fourth 
                                                 
84 Musukubulili F ‘Namibian Labour Dispute Resolution System: Comparison with South Africa’ (2014) 35 Obiter 
127-128. 
85 Musukubulili F ‘Namibian Labour Dispute Resolution System: Comparison with South Africa’ (2014) 35 Obiter 
128. 
86 Labour Act No 11 of 2007. 
87 Section 89 of the Labour Act. 
88 Parker C Labour Law in Namibia (2012) 207. 
89 Parker C Labour Law in Namibia (2012) 207. 
90 Shoprite Namibia (Pty) Ltd v Paulo and Another (LCA 02/2010) [2011] NALC 5. 
91 Shoprite Namibia (Pty) Ltd v Paulo and Another (LCA 02/2010) [2011] NALC 5 para 2. 
92 Mokwena v Shinguadja and Another (LC 52/2011) [2013] NALCMD 10. 
93 Mokwena v Shinguadja and Another (LC 52/2011) [2013] NALCMD 10 para  2. 
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category includes reviews provided by other legislation.94 There are only four grounds under the 
Labour Act for reviewing and setting aside an arbitration award. These grounds comprise of 
misconduct, gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator has 
exceeded his/her power and the award has been obtained improperly.95 These grounds are similar 
to the grounds set out in s 145(2) of the LRA. 
 
 
1.7 CANADIA’S TEST FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
Traditionally Canadian law provided for three standards of review available to reviewing courts 
assessing allegedly substantive irregularities.96 ‘Standard of review’ is the degree of analysis the 
court will apply in reviewing decisions of a statutory body.97 These standards are patent 
unreasonableness, reasonable simpliciter, and correctness.98 Patent unreasonableness requires 
extreme deference to administrative determinations. A patently unreasonable decision is so 
flawed that no amount of crucial deference can justify the decision.99 Correctness allows the 
court to reconsider a matter afresh.100 The court accords no respect to the administrative tribunal 
and assumes its own analysis of the question decided by the tribunal.101 Reasonableness 
simpliciter is where the defect renders a decision unreasonable which might only be apparent 
after significant analysis of the situation.102 The appropriate standard of review in a practical case 
would be determined on the basis of pragmatic and functional analysis. Such an analysis takes 
                                                 
94 Mokwena v Shinguadja and Another (LC 52/2011) [2013] NALCMD 10 para 2. 
95 Section 89(5)(a) and (b) of the Labour Act. 
96 Fergus E From Sidumo to Dunsmuir: The Test for Review of CCMA Arbitration Awards (unpublished LLD 
Thesis, University of Cape Town, 2013) 209. 
97 Salans, Fraser Milner Casgrain and SNR Denton ‘Supreme Court of Canada Rewrites Law on Standard of Review 
in Administrative Law’ http://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2008/april/8/supreme-court-of-canada-
rewrites-law-on-standard-of-review-in-administrative-law---april-2008 (accessed 14 November 2014). 
98 Fergus E From Sidumo to Dunsmuir: The Test for Review of CCMA Arbitration Awards (unpublished LLD 
Thesis, University of Cape Town, 2013) 210. 
99 Heckman G Substantive review in appellate courts since Dunsmuir (2009) 47 OSGOODE Hall Law Journal 755. 
100 Heckman G Substantive review in appellate courts since Dunsmuir (2009) 47 OSGOODE Hall Law Journal 754.  
101 Salans, Fraser Milner Casgrain and SNR Denton ‘Supreme Court of Canada Rewrites Law on Standard of 
Review in Administrative Law’ available at  http://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2008/april/8/supreme-
court-of-canada-rewrites-law-on-standard-of-review-in-administrative-law---april-2008 (accessed 14 November 
2014). 
102 Heckman G Substantive review in appellate courts since Dunsmuir (2009) 47 OSGOODE Hall Law Journal 754. 
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into account numerous factors, such as: the existence of the privative clause, the nature of the 
question in issue and the expertise of the tribunal.103  
 
The majority in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick104 merged the two standards of reasonableness as a 
single standard.105 Accordingly the standard of review in Canadian law are no longer three but 
two, namely that of correctness and reasonableness. 106 When applying the correctness standard a 
reviewing court will not take into consideration a decision-maker’s reasoning process but rather 
undertake its own analysis regarding the reasonableness of the question and decide whether it 
agrees with the determination of the decision-maker.107 When applying the reasonableness 
standard a reviewing court must give respectful attention to the reasons offered or which might 
be offered in support of a decision.108 Thus the review should focus on whether the reasons given 
by the tribunal to support the result achieved in terms of the facts and law. Seemingly the 
standard of review expressed in the Constitutional Court judgment in Sidumo is similar to the 
standard of review with regards to reasonableness expressed in Dunsmuir. 
 
1.8 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS  
 
In this mini thesis, the following will be discussed, with the above as background and the 
objective of determining whether the decision in Sidumo has effectively blurred the lines 
between appeal and review when reviewing an arbitration award. Whether the standard of 
reasonableness as expressed in the Constitutional Court judgment in Sidumo is an appropriate 
mechanism for reviewing arbitral awards. Chapter 2 will be a discussion on how labour law and 
administrative action overlap one another and how courts determine what constitutes as an 
administrative action. 
 
                                                 
103 Salans, Fraser Milner Casgrain and SNR Denton ‘Supreme Court of Canada Rewrites Law on Standard of 
Review in Administrative Law’ available at http://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2008/april/8/supreme-
court-of-canada-rewrites-law-on-standard-of-review-in-administrative-law---april-2008 (accessed 14 November 
2014). 
104 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190. 
105 Heckman G Substantive review in appellate courts since Dunsmuir (2009) 47 OSGOODE Hall Law Journal 751-
755. 
106 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 para 44-45. 
107 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 para 48. 
108 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190 para 48. 
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Chapter 3 will be a discussion on the standard of reasonableness as determined by Sidumo and 
the standard of process-related review as was the approached taken in Herholdt. Analyses will be 
done to determine whether these two standards of review are creating confusion for lower courts 
and whether these two standards are threatening to blur the line between appeal and review.   
 
Finally, in chapter 4 concluding remarks will be made in respect of whether this distinction 
effectively still exists in the context of labour matters, and finally whether it is necessary to 
maintain the distinction in our context. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION: INSIGHT FROM JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The classification of powers exercised by a state entity when making decisions in relation to 
employment has been greatly debated in South Africa.109 Previously some judges accepted that 
employees in the public sector were allowed to bring administrative actions against their 
employers arising from employment-related decisions. Employees alleged that these decisions 
were in breach of their Constitutional rights to lawful and fair administrative action.110 
Accordingly, state employees could choose whether to challenge dismissals and other 
employment related decisions under PAJA or under the LRA.  
 
The CC judgment in Chirwa ended the option of public sector employees to choose between the 
LRA and PAJA. The majority held that where public sector employees have a cause of action 
under the LRA, they cannot seek the protection of PAJA. The court also held that dismissals do 
not constitute administrative action as defined in PAJA and are therefore not subject to review in 
terms thereof. The aim of the court was to divest the HC of jurisdiction in all matters that may 
either be arbitrated or resolved under the LRA.111 The court held that the LC has exclusive 
jurisdiction over such matters.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to test the various debates on whether the state as employer’s decisions 
amounts to administrative action. Judicial decisions on this issue are not harmonious. There are 
two schools of thought on how powers exercised by the state and organs of state must be 
characterised. One school of thought is of the view that all employment relationships should be 
regulated by labour law including the right to fair labour practices in terms of s 23 of the 
                                                 
109 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 210. 
110 Grogan J Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution (2010) 68. 
111 Grogan J Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution (2010) 68. 
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Constitution112. Accordingly, administrative law, PAJA and the right to just administrative 
justice in terms of s 33 of the Constitution is excluded.113 The second school of thought is of the 
view that the exercise of public power attracts administrative law and labour law and that the 
employee has the option to choose between the two rights.114 
 
 By resolving this confusion the courts discuss s 23 and s 33 of the Constitution115 and how they 
are separate to one another. Section 23 of the Constitution preserves the right to fair labour 
practices.116 The LRA was enacted to provide particularity and content to s 23. Section 33 of the 
Constitution117 preserves the right to just administrative action which is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. PAJA was enacted to ensure just administrative action.  
 
Specific consideration will be given to pre-constitutional administrative law which influenced 
the public employment sector for purpose of protecting public employees. Public sector 
employees were excluded from the 1956 LRA. An evaluation of the decision in Zenzile118 will be 
the point of departure and how this decision is no longer relevant to the Constitutional era. The 
discussion that follows will consider the overlap between labour law and administrative law and 
the school of thought the CC has adopted in terms of defining what constitutes an administrative 
action. 
 
2.2 THE PRECEDENT IN ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSVAAL & OTHERS V ZENZILE 
AND SUBSEQUENT CASES 
 
In the pre-constitutional era, the Zenzile judgment sought to provide clarity with regards to 
administrative law principles and their application to the contractual relationships between the 
public sector and its employees. 
 
                                                 
112 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
113 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 128. 
114 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 128. 
115 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
116 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
117 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
118 Administrator, Transvaal & others v Zenzile & others (1991) 12 ILJ 259 (A). 
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In Zenzile, employees of the provincial administration were successful in challenging their 
dismissal for striking. They argued that the decision had been taken without first giving them an 
opportunity to a hearing. They also contended that they were protected by the principles of 
administrative law on the basis that they are public servants. Their reasoning was based on the 
premise that the audi alteram partem119 doctrine is a well-established principle of administrative 
law. They contended that the failure to apply these principles made the decision premature and 
thus unlawful.  
 
The court of appeal agreed with their argument and reinstated them with retrospective effect. In 
making the determination, Hoexter JA held that the employees’ loss of pay and related benefits 
was sufficient to review the decision under administrative law. In upholding the appeal, the 
Appellate Court rejected the averments of the state counsel that the relationship between the two 
parties amounted to a contract of employment and that the court must base its decision on the 
principals governing the law of contract. In opposition to this view, Hoexter JA held that there is 
no reason in principle why the decisions relating to contracts should be approached in some other 
manner.120 The appropriate approach was to ask whether the decision-maker’s powers to dismiss 
are sourced in statute. If this is the case then the decision warranted judicial intervention by way 
of review. 
 
Hoexter JA’s decision was based on the existence of a Code that had been promulgated under the 
prevailing Public Service Act121 which regulates conditions of employment within the service. 
He held that the Code, supported by the Act placed the relationship between the two parties 
beyond the realm of pure contract. In making this ruling, Hoexter JA, focused on the nature of 
the relationship between the employer and employee and held as follows: 
‘[The Court in Zenzile was not concerned with the] mere employment under a contract of 
service between two private individuals, but ... a form of employment which the law will 
protect. Here the employer and decision-maker is a public authority whose decision to 
dismiss involved the exercise of a public power. The element of public service injected by 
statute necessarily entails, so I consider, that the respondents were entitled to the benefit of 
                                                 
119 Audi alteram partem means, “let the other side be heard as well”. No person should be judged without having a 
fair hearing first. Each party must be given a fair opportunity to respond to the evidence against them. 
120 Administrator, Transvaal & others v Zenzile & others (1991) 12 ILJ 259 (A) para 38. 
121 Public Service Act, 111 of 1984. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
the application of the principles of natural justice before they could be summarily dismissed 
for misconduct. Where an employee has this protection legal remedies are available to him to 
quash a dismissal not carried out in accordance with the principles of natural justice ... ‘122 
 
Hence therefore, the employees were entitled to the protection under administrative law, such 
protection, emanating from the fact that the relationship between them and their employers was 
partially based on a statutory instrument.123 In essence the judgment in Zenzile affords state 
employees the protection under administrative law, as the relationship between them and their 
employee’s amounts to administrative action. 
 
The judgment in SA Police Union & Another v National Commissioner of the SA Police Service 
& Another124(SAPU) rejected the precedent of Zenzile. The court’s primary reason is based on 
the fact that the decision in Zenzile is no longer applicable since its ‘doctrinal underpinnings’ is 
not in line with the constitutional era.125 In SAPU; the question raised was whether the 
Commissioner of Police, when acting as an employer, is under a constitutional, statutory or 
contractual duty to consult with members of the South African Police Service (SAPS) or their 
representative when unilaterally altering their working hours.  
 
The court agreed that the source of the Commissioner’s powers in regard to labour matters is 
derived from s 24(1) of the South African Police Service Act.126 The Act empowers the Minister 
to make regulations in relation to conditions of service of members and labour relations.127 In 
making regulations the Minister granted the Commissioner the authority to regulate working 
hours. This gives him the right to exercise this authority unilaterally, or bi-laterally, in terms of 
existing contracts of employment or collective agreements. The power of the Commissioner is 
derived from a public source, but the CC has indicated that the source of the power, while 
                                                 
122 Administrator, Transvaal & others v Zenzile & others (1991) 12 ILJ 259 (A) 32-33. 
123 Brassey M ‘Back off but back up! Administrative Law rightly yields to Labour Law.’ (2009) 2 Constitutional 
Court review 214. 
124 SA Police Union & Another v National Commissioner of the SA Police Service & Another (2005) 26 ILJ 2403 
(LC). 
125 SA Police Union & Another v National Commissioner of the SA Police Service & Another (2005) 26 ILJ 2403 
(LC) para 67. 
126 South African Police Service Act 68 of  1995. 
127 SA Police Union & Another v National Commissioner of the SA Police Service & Another (2005) 26 ILJ 2403 
(LC) para 51. 
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relevant is not necessarily decisive. The court held that the nature of the power, its subject matter 
and whether it involves the exercise of public duty is equally important. Setting the working 
hours of the police officers is not inherently public. Neither is there a concern for public law as 
the present issue falls within the ambit of contractual regulation of private employment relations. 
The powers and functions of the Commissioner arise from employment law and are bound by the 
constitutional rights to fair labour practices and to engage in collective bargaining. To define that 
every act of an organ of state amounts to an administrative action will carry the risk of imposing 
on the State burdens that normally would not be encountered by other actors in the private 
sphere.128 In order for a decision to fall within the definition of administrative action, such a 
decision must be one which would adversely affect the rights of any citisen and it must have a 
direct or external legal effect.129 In reaching this conclusion Murphy AJ disagreed with two 
earlier judgments in Mbayeka & another v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape130 and Simela & 
others v MEC for Education, Eastern Cape & another131.  
 
Mbayeka dealt with an application to the HC seeking a declaration that suspension from 
employment without emoluments was unconstitutional. Both applicants are employees of the 
Department of Welfare in the Provincial Government of the Eastern Cape. The applicants were 
arrested by the police on allegations of fraud and theft relating to the payment of social pension 
benefits. The respondent argued that the HC had no jurisdiction to hear the matter as it amounts 
to an unfair labour practice which falls solely within the jurisdiction of the LC. Jafta J held, when 
the respondent suspended the applicants she exercised a public power. This power is derived 
from s 22(7) of the Public Service Act132. The failure to afford the applicants a hearing before the 
suspension constituted an unconstitutional administrative action.133 
 
In Simela, nine applicants were seeking an order to have their transfers from Ebenezer 
Majombozi High School to various other schools declared unlawful. The applicants were all 
                                                 
128 SA Police Union & Another v National Commissioner of the SA Police Service & Another (2005) 26 ILJ  
2403 (LC) para 51. 
129 SA Police Union & Another v National Commissioner of the SA Police Service & Another (2005) 26 ILJ 2403 
(LC) para 57. 
130 Mbayeka & another v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape [2001] 1 All SA 567 (Tk). 
131 Simela & others v MEC for Education, Eastern Cape & another [2001] 9 BLLR 1685 (LC). 
132 Public Service Act 103 of 1994. 
133 Mbayeka & another v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape [2001] 1 All SA 567 (Tk) para 29. 
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employed as educators by the Department of Education of the Province of the Eastern Cape at 
Ebenezer Majombozi High School for different periods. Francis AJ held that the decision taken 
by the respondent to transfer an employee in the absence of a hearing or any consultation 
preceding the transfer amounts to an unfair administrative act and an unfair labour practice.134 
 
Murphy AJ in SAPU disagreed with these two judgments based on the argument that neither of 
these two judgments paid attention to the definition of administrative action defined in PAJA. He 
further held that the courts in these two judgments based their reason on the assumption that the 
power to suspend or transfer is sourced in legislation.135 What is equally important is the nature 
of the power and the subject matter. Disciplinary or operational transfers and suspensions are 
employment or labour matters and not administrative acts.136 By defining employer’s conduct as 
administrative action loses their force due to the codification of administrative law and labour 
law and the full protection of public sector employees by the LRA. He held that courts might 
have to consider the previous doctrine in light of the constitution and statutory framework.137 
 
It is difficult to argue that the decision in Zenzile is no longer binding in cases involving public 
sector dismissal.138 In Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union and others v Minister of 
Correctional Services and others139 (POPCRU) this was the view taken by Plasket J.140 The 
matter before the court in POPCRU was for the dismissal of several correctional officers at 
Middledrift Prison for misconduct. It was argued that the decisions taken by the officials of the 
Department of Correctional Services did not constitute administrative action, as no public power 
                                                 
134 Simela & others v MEC for Education, Eastern Cape & another [2001] 9 BLLR 1685 (LC) para 54-55 & 59. 
135 SA Police Union & Another v National Commissioner of the SA Police Service & Another (2005) 26 ILJ 2403 
(LC) para 60. 
136 SA Police Union & Another v National Commissioner of the SA Police Service & Another (2005) 26 ILJ 2403 
(LC) para 60. 
137 SA Police Union & Another v National Commissioner of the SA Police Service & Another (2005) 26 ILJ 2403 
(LC) para 66. 
138 PAJA Newsletter Special issue: The application of PAJA to employment law disputes’ available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/paja/docs/newsletters/Newsletter%20special%20issue_Labour%20Law%20Sep%2007 
(accessed 1 April 2015) at 4. 
139 Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union and others v Minister of Correctional Services and others [2006] 2 All SA 
175 (E). 
140 PAJA Newsletter Special issue: The application of PAJA to employment law disputes’ available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/paja/docs/newsletters/Newsletter%20special%20issue_Labour%20Law%20Sep%2007 
(accessed 1 April 2015) at 4. 
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was exercised.141 Such a decision did not affect the public as a whole. The court, however, was 
of the opinion that the indefinable concept of public power is not limited to the exercise of power 
that impact on the public as a whole. The exercise of the power to arrest is an administrative act 
which will only impact on the arrestee and the complainant. “A decision by the Amnesty 
Committee of the erstwhile Truth and Reconciliation Commission to grant a person amnesty 
from the civil and criminal consequences of his or her politically motivated crimes”142, is another 
example of an administrative act. The power involved in these instances is derived from a public 
functionary who is required to exercise it in the interest of the public and not in his or her private 
capacity. 
 
Plasket J held that in his view: 
‘The statutory basis of the power to employ and dismiss correctional officers, the 
subservience of the respondents to the Constitution generally and s 195 in particular, the 
public character of the Department and the pre-eminence of the public interest in the proper 
administration of prisons and the attainment of the purposes specified in s 2 of the 
Correctional Services Act all strengthen my view that the powers that are sought to be 
reviewed in this matter are public powers as envisaged by the common law, the Constitution 
and the PAJA.’143 
The officers are responsible for the prisoners who are in their custody and care based upon an 
order of the court. The purpose and nature of their detention is a matter of public concern and 
interest.144 Notably, Plasket J notes that the court was bound by the decision in Zenzile. The court 
in Zenzile held that the decision of a public authority to dismiss an employee is an exercise of 
public power. Cases which ruled that public sector dismissals amount to administrative action are 
no longer applicable.145 These cases relied on the judgment in Zenzile and must be understood in 
                                                 
141 Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union and others v Minister of Correctional Services and others [2006] 2 All SA 
175 (E) para 52. 
142 Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union and others v Minister of Correctional Services and others [2006] 2 All SA 
175 (E) para 53. 
143 Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union and others v Minister of Correctional Services and others [2006] 2 All SA 
175 (E) para 54. 
144 Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union and others v Minister of Correctional Services and others [2006] 2 All SA 
175 (E) para 54. 
145 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 148. 
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light of the history of the public sector employees who were previously excluded from the 
protection of the LRA.146 
 
 
2.3 TRANSNET LTD & OTHERS V CHIRWA: THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE AND LABOUR LAW 
 
In the case of Chirwa the SCA had the opportunity to address the relationship between public 
sector employment and administrative law.147 In Chirwa the employee was dismissed on the 
grounds of poor work performance. Chirwa applied to the HC to have her disciplinary 
proceedings set aside on the bases that the presiding officer was biased and that she was not 
given the opportunity to obtain legal representation. The HC held that the employer had breached 
Chirwa’s natural justice and ordered her reinstatement. Chirwa’s dismissal was set aside and she 
was awarded the common law remedies of reinstatement and nine months back pay. With the 
leave of the HC, Chirwa’s employer’s appealed to the SCA. 
 
Three SCA judges (Conradie JA, Cameron JA, Mpati DP) held that public sector employment 
decisions are administrative action, while Mthiyane JA and Jafta JA held that such decisions are 
not administrative actions because they do not amount to exercises of public power. 
 
Cameron JA adopted the view of Plasker J in the case of POPCRU. He held that it is difficult to 
see why the decision of a state organ to dismiss an employee does not constitute administrative 
action.148 Transnet is a public entity created by statute and governed by statute, therefore, 
Transnet’s ‘every act derives from its public, statutory character, including the dismissal.’149 The 
doctrine adopted in Zenzile and the cases that followed after it, ‘was that employment with a 
public body attracts the protections of natural justice because the employer is a public authority 
                                                 
146 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 148. 
147 Transnet Ltd & others v Chirwa (2007) (2) SA 198 (SCA). 
148 Transnet Ltd & others v Chirwa (2007) (2) SA 198 (SCA) para 51. 
149 Transnet Ltd & others v Chirwa (2007) (2) SA 198 (SCA) para 52. 
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whose employment-related decisions involve the exercise of public power.’150 Transnet’s 
conduct therefore constitutes administrative action.  
 
Conradie JA supported the approach of Murphy AJ in SAPU. He accepted without reason that 
the dismissal of Chirwa amounted to administrative action. He further held that through the 
establishment of the 1996 LRA, dismissals in the public sector can no longer be regarded as 
administrative acts. He argued that the intention of the legislature through the LRA was to ensure 
that all unfair dismissal disputes of all employees be dealt with in terms of the LRA.151 Even if 
Chirwa had a cause of action under PAJA, she is still limited to relief under the LRA. Conradie 
JA reasoned that the provisions set out in s 158(1)(h) of the LRA confers jurisdiction on the LC 
to review an administrative act performed by an organ of state as an employer.152 
 
Mthiyane JA agreed that Transnet is an organ of state as defined in s 239 of the Constitution153 
and bound by these principles. The nature of the power or function is important to look at when 
determining whether the states conduct amounts to administrative action. The identity of the 
functionary exercising the power or performing the function is secondary. Mthiyane JA holds 
that the nature of the conduct of Transnet is the termination of a contract of employment. Such 
conduct does not involve the exercise of any public power or performance of a public function in 
terms of a statute. Contract of employment does not affect the public and is therefore not 
governed by administrative law. The power to dismiss Chirwa did not amount to an 
administrative action. Transnet is merely acting in his capacity as employer.154 
 
The matter of Chirwa was appealed to the CC. The question on whether the dismissal of a public 
sector employee amounts to administrative action arose again before the CC. Chirwa believed 
that she had a right to bring her action under PAJA in the HC because her dismissal amounted to 
administrative action. Chirwa based her argument on the fact that Transnet had failed to comply 
with the relevant provisions of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal.155 In essence Chirwa is 
                                                 
150 Transnet Ltd & others v Chirwa (2007) (2) SA 198 (SCA) para 52. 
151 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 29. 
152 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 29. 
153 Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
154 Transnet Ltd & others v Chirwa (2007) (2) SA 198 (SCA) para 15-16. 
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invoking her right to fair administrative action on the basis of Transnet’s failure to comply with 
the LRA.  
 
Previously, state employees had no protection under the 1965 LRA156, however, this position has 
subsequently been amended by the current LRA. State employees now enjoy protection under 
the LRA, but still enjoy access to civil courts for relief under PAJA, placing them in a more 
favorable position to those of the private sector.157 On the surface, it appears as if dismissals of 
public sector employees affects their labour rights, and further, (or as well as) their right to 
administrative justice.158 These two rights are entrenched in the Constitution, with each 
containing its own aims and resultant specialised legislation which gives effect to their distinct 
objectives. This was emphasised in SAPU. 
 
The aim of ‘labour law as embodied in the LRA is to provide a comprehensive system of dispute 
resolution mechanisms, forums and remedies which are tailored to deal with all aspects of 
employment,’159 Whereas, the aim of administrative justice is to ensure that procedural fairness 
is achieved in matters between the state and the public.160 The LRA must be seen as the more 
appropriate route to pursue, as an employee is protected from arbitrary and irrational decisions, 
through substantive fairness requirements and a right not to be subjected to unfair labour 
practices.161 
 
The outcomes of a judicial review of an administrative decision will more often be set aside. Yet 
an employer is not prevented from restarting disciplinary proceedings, nor is an employee 
prevented from been dismissed after a fresh hearing that will remove all original defects.162 
Skweyiya J was of the opinion that the forums provided for by the LRA allows for a variety of 
purpose-built, employment-focused relief, which is not available under the provisions of 
PAJA.163 
                                                 
156 Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. 
157 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 40. 
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Irrespective of whether an employer is in the public or private sector, the LRA is the point of 
departure on matters concerning allegations of unfair dismissal and unfair labour practice.164 The 
LRA does not distinguish between the state as an employer and any other employer.  
 
Only acts of an administrative nature are subject to the administrative justice right in s 33 of the 
Constitution.165 When determining what constitutes an administrative action, the focus must not 
be on the position which the functionary occupies but rather on the nature of the power being 
exercised. Based on the above, the conduct of Transnet would therefore, not constitutes 
administrative action under s 33 of the Constitution.166 
 
Ngcobo J referred to the principles laid down in President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others v South Africa Rugby Football Union and Others 167(SARFU) to determine whether 
Transnet’s conduct amounts to administrative action.168 In this case the court had to determine 
when courts may review the exercise of presidential powers. The court also looked at 
circumstances when a President can be called to testify upon in a court of law. The court 
emphasised that not all conduct of the State and its organs will amount to administrative action 
under s 33 of the Constitution169. Certain acts of the state may amount to administrative action. 
Similarly the state will from time to time carry out administrative tasks. The focus of the enquiry 
as to whether the conduct amounts to administrative action is not concerned with the 
performance by a member of the executive arm of government.170 
 
The court held: 
‘[When] determining whether an action should be characterised as the implementation of 
legislation or the formulation of policy may be difficult. It will, as we have said above, 
legislation or the formulation of policy may be difficult. It will, [as was said above], depend 
                                                 
164 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 64. 
165 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 72 
166 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 73 & 150. 
167 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South Africa Rugby Football Union and Others 2000 (1) 
SA 1 (CC); 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC). 
168 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 129. 
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SA 1 (CC); 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC) para 141. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
primarily upon the nature of the power. A series of considerations may be relevant to 
deciding on which side of the line a particular action falls. The source of the power, though 
not necessarily decisive, is a relevant factor. So too is the nature of the power, its subject 
matter, whether it involves the exercise of a public duty, and how closely it is related on the 
one hand to policy matters, which are not administrative, and on the other to the 
implementation of legislation, which is. While the subject matter of a power is not relevant to 
determine whether constitutional review is appropriate, it is relevant to determine whether 
the exercise of the power constitutes administrative action for the purposes of s 33. Difficult 
boundaries may have to be drawn in deciding what should and what should not be 
characterised as administrative action for the purposes of s 33. These will need to be drawn 
carefully in the light of the provisions of the Constitution and the overall constitutional 
purpose of an efficient, equitable, and ethical public administration. This can best be done on 
a case by case basis.’171 
 
According to Ngcobo J, Transnet’s power is the termination of employment for poor work 
performance. The source of the power is derived from the employment contract between Chirwa 
and Transnet. When Transnet terminated Chirwa’s contract of employment, Transnet was 
exercising its contractual power. Such power does not involve the implementation of legislation, 
which amounts to administrative action. Termination of Chirwa’s employment does not amount 
to administrative action according Ngcobo J.172 Section 33 of the Constitution is not concerned 
with every act of administration executed by an organ of state.173 The fact that Transnet is an 
organ of State, which exercises public power, does not convert the conduct of Transnet in 
terminating Chirwa’s employment contract into administrative action.174 
 
Instances where courts have defined dismissals by the state as an employer amounted to 
administrative action; such decisions were derived from the principles of Zenzile.175 Ngcobo J is 
of the opinion that these principles need to be understood in light of history and the position of 
                                                 
171 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South Africa Rugby Football Union and Others2000 (1) 
SA 1 (CC); 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC) para 143. 
172 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 142. 
173 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 142. 
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the LRA during the time of Zenzile.176 Previously public sector employees were excluded from 
the LRA and had no protection against employment decisions made by the state as an employer. 
In order to protect the public sector employees the courts held that employment decisions made 
by state employers amount to administrative action. Since the new constitutional era, the position 
has changed. Section 23 of the Constitution protects all employees, including those in the public 
sector except those who are specifically excluded from its provisions and the right to fair labour 
practices. ‘Labour and employment rights such as the right to a fair hearing, substantive fairness, 
and remedies for non-compliance are now codified in the LRA.’177 It is thus no longer necessary 
to subject public sector employees to the protection of administrative law. The Constitution does 
not differentiate between public and private sector employees. The Constitution states that all 
workers must be treated equally and any deviation from this principle must be justified.178 
Ngcobo J is of the opinion that there is no reason why public sector employees who are protected 
by the LRA, should be treated differently to the private sector employees and be given more 
rights.179 A public sector employee who challenges employment decisions made by state 
employers, does not have two causes of action, one derived from the LRA and another from the 
Constitution and PAJA.180 A public sector employee only has one cause of action and that is 
under the LRA.181 
 
2.4 RE-AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
IN CHIRWA: THE CASE OF GCABA V MINISTER OF SAFETY AND 
SECURITY 
 
The majority finding in Chirwa was re-affirmed in Gcaba v Minister of Safety & Security & 
Others182. In Gcaba the appellant challenged a decision not to appoint or promote him to an 
upgraded position in the SAPS. The applicant was appointed to the position of station 
commissioner in Grahamstown. When the position was upgraded the applicant applied for the 
position, yet he was not appointed. The applicant lodged a grievance with the SAPS, but later 
                                                 
176 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 148. 
177 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 148. 
178 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 149. 
179 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 149. 
180 Chirwa v Transnet [2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 149. 
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discarded of this process and instead elected to refer the dispute to the Safety and Security 
Sectorial Bargaining Council. SAPS failed to attend the pre-arbitration meeting and the applicant 
withdrew the dispute from the Bargaining Council. The applicant lodged a grievance with the 
SAPS, but later discarded this process, rather, choosing to refer the dispute to the Safety and 
Security Sectorial Bargaining Council. The issue confronting the CC was once again whether the 
failure to promote and appoint Gcaba (a public official) was an administrative action subject to 
review.  
 
Gcaba contested that his claim was from the start embedded to a large extend in administrative 
law. His claim was heavily reliant on the right to fair administrative action envisaged by PAJA, 
while the right to fair labour practices under the LRA amounted to a subsidiary argument.183 
Gcaba contested that the decision not to appoint him amounted to administrative review and 
should be set aside. The respondents, however, argued that the applicants claim is a labour 
matter, therefore, making the LRA applicable. The respondents do not deny the fact that the 
power to appoint was one exercised by an organ of state. However, the respondents contested 
that the power exercised by the SAPS is private in nature and vests in the employer. The 
respondents further held that the decision by the SAPS whether or not to promote the applicant is 
no different from a decision to dismiss or to change shift arrangements.184  
 
It was held that employment and labour relationship issues do not extend to administrative action 
within the scope of PAJA.185 Section 23 of the Constitution186 regulates the relationship between 
employer and employee and guarantees the right to lawful, reasonably and procedurally fair 
administrative action. Section 33 of the Constitution187, however, does not regulate the 
relationship between the state as an employer and employees. By separating these two sections 
the court sustains the interdependence and inseparability of human rights and acknowledges that 
conduct in the workplace may give rise to a variety of different claims.188 When a state employee 
                                                 
183 Gcaba v Minister of Safety & Security & Others (2009) 30 ILJ 2623 (CC) para 44. 
184 Gcaba v Minister of Safety & Security & Others (2009) 30 ILJ 2623 (CC) para 50. Also see Chirwa v Transnet 
[2008] 2 BLLR 97 (CC) para 133-4 and SA Police Union & Another v National Commissioner of the SA Police 
Service & Another (2005) 26 ILJ 2403 (LC) para 51. 
185 Gcaba v Minister of Safety & Security & Others (2009) 30 ILJ 2623 (CC) para 64. 
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challenges the decision of the state as employer, such conduct has very little or no direct 
implications or consequences for other citisens, such conduct does not amount to administrative 
action.189 
 
The CC approved the distinction drawn by Murphy AJ in SAPU’s in relation to tendering 
contracting processes and employment. The court held that there are material differences 
between tender processes and employment. The Constitution expressly regulates employment 
relationships in s 23 of the Constitution190. This, nonetheless, is not the same for procurement 
and employment relationship is different from the contractual relationship which reinforces 
procurement.191 The court concludes by stating that the employment decision at issue in SAPU 
was not an administrative action. Removing decisions made by state employers from the ambit of 
administrative law does not mean that employees are no longer protected.  An employment 
relationship is not a bargaining of equals, but a relationship of demand. Section 23 of the 
Constitution192 is an express constitutional acknowledgment of the special status of employment 
relationships. Importantly, by placing the decisions of state employers within the ambit of labour 
related issues, the court removes the problems of parallel systems of law and duplicated 
jurisdiction.193 
 
Chirwa and Gcaba were considered in Hendricks v Overstrand Municipality194. The LAC in 
Hendricks interpreted s 158(1)(h) of the LRA. The CC in Chirwa and Gcaba did not deal with s 
158(1)(h) when determining whether a state employers conduct in terms of unfair labour practice 
and dismissal amounts to administrative action.  
 
The appellant in Hendricks was the Chief: Law Enforcement and Security at Overstrand 
Municipality. He was responsible for inter alia administering general law enforcement in the 
                                                 
189 Gcaba v Minister of Safety & Security & Others (2009) 30 ILJ 2623 (CC) para 64. 
190 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
191 Gcaba v Minister of Safety & Security & Others (2009) 30 ILJ 2623 (CC) para 65. 
192 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
193 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 214. 
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municipality. The position which Hendrick held was a senior one and he was expected to observe 
a high degree of integrity and honesty.195  
 
Hendricks was charged with rude, abusive behavior to a fellow employee; dishonesty, including 
fraudulent misrepresentation and breaches of the code of conduct. A disciplinary hearing was 
held and chaired by an independent presiding officer in terms of the Disciplinary Procedure and 
Code Collective Agreement. Hendricks was found guilty on two charges and Hendricks pleaded 
guilty to one of the three charges.196 
 
The presiding officer imposed a sanction of a final written warning valid for 12 months on the 
first charge, and a suspension without pay for 10 days, coupled with a final written warning valid 
for 12 months on the second charge.197 
 
Overstrand Municipality applied to the LC seeking an order for reviewing and setting aside the 
decision of the presiding officer and replacing it with the sanction of dismissal.198 The 
Overstrand Municipality made the application in terms of s 158(1)(h) of the LRA. They argued 
that the decision made by the presiding officer was irrational and unreasonable and that it can be 
reviewed on the above grounds ‘which are permissible in law’. They further argued that the trust 
relationship between them and Hendricks has been destroyed and the only rational and 
reasonable sanction in the present circumstances would be dismissal.199 
 
The LC held that a review was allowed under s 158(1)(h) and set aside the decision of the 
presiding officer and substituted it with a sanction of dismissal. The LC characterised the 
decision of the presiding officer as an administrative action even though the LC did not explicitly 
state it. The LC set the decision aside on the grounds that the presiding officer’s decision was 
                                                 
195 Hendricks v Overstrand Municipality & another (CA24/2013) [2014] ZALAC 49; [2014] 12 BLLR 1170 (LAC);    
(2015) 36 ILJ 163 (LAC) para 2. 
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irrational and unreasonable. These grounds are set out in s 6(2)(ii) and 6(2)(h) of PAJA. S 1 of 
PAJA states that any decision taken by an organ of the state when exercising a constitutional or 
public power or performing a public function in terms of legislation which adversely affects the 
rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect. 
 
Hendricks held that the LC had erred in finding that Overstrand Municipality was entitled to 
approach the court on review in terms of s 158(1)(h) of the LRA to challenge the finding of the 
presiding officer. Hendricks argument is based on s 23 and 33 of the Constitution which deals 
with fair labour practices and just administrative action which was dealt with by the CC in 
Chirwa and Gcaba.200 
 
Ncgobo J held in the CC judgment of Chirwa that the subject matter of power involved in 
Chirwa was the termination of a contract of employment and that such did not involve an act of 
administrative even though the employer in Chirwa was a state entity. This dictum was endorsed 
by the CC in Gcaba and who further discussed the relationship between the constitutional right 
to fair labour practices and the right to administrative justice. The CC in Gcaba held that 
employment and labour relationship issues do not amount to administrative action within the 
meaning of PAJA where the state is an employer. 
 
The CC in Chirwa and Gcaba supported the general proposition that public sector employees 
aggrieved by dismissal or unfair labour practices must pursue the remedies set out in s 191 and 
193 of the LRA as mandated and circumscribed by s 23 of the Constitution. As previously stated 
the CC in Chirwa and Gcaba made no explicit finding in relation to s 158(1)(h) of the LRA.201 
 
The LAC in Hendricks held that Overstrand Municipality is an organ of state as defined in s 239 
of the Constitution. When such a body discipline’s a senior employee who holds a public or 
quasi-public office in law enforcement, it can be seen to be exercising a public power or 
performing a pubic function in terms of local authority legislation and any applicable statutory 
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collective agreement.202 The presiding officer’s power arises from the provisions of a statutory 
collective agreement.203 Such agreements are not their totality contractual in nature, especially 
when concluded in a bargaining council between an employers’ organisation and trade unions.204 
The LAC further held that the structural elements of the agreement arises from the process of 
collective bargaining, therefore the decision made by the presiding officer qua employer is a 
decision of an administrative nature by an organ of state performing a public function in terms of 
the legislation governing local government. 205 This position is different to that which was taken 
by the CC in Chirwa and Gcaba where the CC in fact held that employment and labour issues 
does not amount to administrative action.   
 
The LAC held that Overstrand Municipality has a public duty to ensure that there is no 
corruption and malfeasance from within its ranks and structures. Therefore the decision made by 
the presiding officer is indeed administrative within in the meaning of PAJA according to the 
LAC in Hendricks206. The corruption and malfeasance of an employee has a direct, external legal 
effect in its consequences for ratepayers and citisens in general.207 It is however not necessary to 
classify the decision of the presiding officer as an administrative action in terms of PAJA before 
a review will be competent under s 158(1)(h) of the LRA. The LC may review a decision of the 
State acting as employer on any ground ‘permissible in law’208. Review under PAJA is only one 
kind of administrative law review. Other exercises of public power are reviewable on 
constitutional grounds of legality and rationality209 
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Even though dismissals and employment decisions in the public sector are now regulated by the 
LRA, it does not imply that administrative law is no longer applicable.210  
 
It is submitted that employment relationships should not be governed by public law principles 
such as administrative law as it is not appropriate.211 Administrative action and labour relations 
are two different areas of law however they have many common characteristics. Administrative 
law is part of public law, as opposed to labour law which has elements of administrative law, 
procedural law, private law and commercial law.212 Administrative action does not embrace acts 
that are regulated by private law.213 The extension of the provisions of the LRA to employees of 
the state and organs of state based on dismissals are now excluded from administrative law.214 In 
respect of dismissals and unfair labour practices and in respect of all employment related issues, 
employees are now unable to use PAJA as recourse.215 
 
A public sector employee who is aggrieved by the decision of an independent presiding officer 
who chaired a disciplinary hearing has the recourse to apply to the LC to have the decision 
reviewed of the presiding officer. The LC can review the decision on the grounds listed in PAJA 
provided that the decision amounts to an administrative action; in terms of the common law in 
relation to domestic or contractual disciplinary proceedings; or in accordance with the 
requirements of the constitutional principle of legality and rationality.216 S 158(1)(h) of the LRA 
is the only remedy available to a State employers aggrieved by the disciplinary sanction imposed 
                                                 
210 ‘PAJA Newsletter Special issue: The application of PAJA to employment law disputes’ available at 
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by an independent presiding officer217. S 191(1)(a) of the LRA expressly restricts  these remedies 
to state and private sector employees who is aggrieved by an unfair labour practice or a 
dismissal.218 
 
The following chapter will be discussing the standard of review as was determined by the CC in 
Sidumo. The SCA in Sidumo held that decisions made by a commissioner of the CCMA are 
administrative action as defined in PAJA and is therefore reviewable in terms of PAJA. The CC 
in Sidumo held that a decision made by a Commissioner does amount to administrative action. It 
however does not mean that PAJA is automatically applicable to the review of CCMA arbitration 
awards. CCMA arbitration awards are reviewable on the grounds listed in section 145 of the 
LRA. However the CC in Sidumo determined that the standard of reasonableness is the ground 
upon which an arbitration award can be reviewed on. Reasonableness suffused the grounds listed 
in section 145. All employees, whether in the private or public sector can have CCMA arbitration 
awards reviewed on the ground of unreasonableness.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLIED BY LABOUR COURTS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 The issue of reviewing CCMA arbitration awards has been a subject of debate over a number of 
years.219 The core question was: To what extent should the labour courts be able to set aside 
CCMA awards.220 Labour courts have constantly been pushing the boundaries of the test for 
review of CCMA arbitration awards since the enactment of the LRA.221 Over the years, the 
concept of a review has been interpreted both widely and narrowly by the courts.222 In 2007, the 
CC in Sidumo clarified and determined the approach that our courts must adopt when reviewing 
CCMA arbitration awards.223 The CC determined that the test to be applied when reviewing 
awards should be to establish whether the award was made by a ‘reasonable decision-maker.’ 
Notwithstanding this, the interpretation of what constitutes a review still varies after Sidumo. 
 
 In 2012, the LAC in Herholdt developed the reviewing test further.224 It was held that an 
arbitration award can be reviewed on the grounds of latent gross irregularity - a more generous 
approach to the test determined in Sidumo.225 The above approach allows an arbitration award to 
                                                 
219 Rogers P & Naidu C ‘Test for review relooked – is there still scope for process related review or is it limited to 
Sidumo’s outcome-based approach?’ available at  http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=63b12c19-a56a-
4a12-8f31-9b05de51fff5  (accessed 28 October 2014). 
220 Rogers P & Naidu C ‘Test for review relooked – is there still scope for process related review or is it limited to 
Sidumo’s outcome-based approach?’ available at  http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=63b12c19-a56a-
4a12-8f31-9b05de51fff5  (accessed 28 October 2014). 
221 Myburgh A ‘The test for review of CCMA arbitration awards: an update’ (2013) 23(4) Contemporary Labour 
Law 31. 
222 Rogers P & Naidu C ‘Test for review relooked – is there still scope for process related review or is it limited to 
Sidumo’s outcome-based approach?’ available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=63b12c19-a56a-
4a12-8f31-9b05de51fff5  (accessed 28 October 2014). 
223 Rogers P & Naidu C ‘Test for review relooked – is there still scope for process related review or is it limited to 
Sidumo’s outcome-based approach?’ available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=63b12c19-a56a-
4a12-8f31-9b05de51fff5  (accessed 28 October 2014). See also Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) 
[2013] ZASCA 97 para 14. 
224 Myburgh A ‘The test for review of CCMA arbitration awards: an update’ (2013) 23(4) Contemporary Labour 
Law 31. 
225 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd [2012] 9 BLLR 857 (LAC) para 39. 
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be set aside even if the outcome of the award is one that a reasonable decision-maker could have 
reached.226 The award can be set aside if the process through which the award was arrived at was 
found to be materially wanting.227 The SCA in Herholdt held that the LAC had erred in its 
development of the review test.228 
 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse Sidumo and Herholdt as these two judgments deal with 
reviews of arbitration awards on the grounds of latent gross irregularity and unreasonableness, 
respectively. More specifically, the findings of the SCA in Herholdt point out the difference 
between these two grounds.  
 
Further, a comparison will be between the standards of review applied in South Africa and those 
applied in Canada, with specific consideration of the judgment in Dunsmuir.229 The court in 
Dunsmuir determined the standard for reviews which the reviewing courts should apply in 
relation to arbitration awards made by adjudicators. 
 
A further comparison will be made between South Africa and Namibia and their judicial review 
procedures. South Africa and Namibia’s labour laws are similar yet different. Namibia’s Labour 
Act allows an aggrieved party the opportunity to have the arbitration award appealed or 
reviewed. The LRA does not make provision for an appeal against arbitration awards.230 An 
aggrieved party can only have the award reviewed on limited grounds as set out in s 145 of the 
LRA. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
226 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 17. 
227 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 17. 
228 Myburgh A ‘The test for review of CCMA arbitration awards: an update’ (2013) 23(4) Contemporary Labour 
Law 31. 
229 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick [2008] 1 SCR 190. 
230 Rogers P & Naidu C ‘Test for review relooked – is there still scope for process related review or is it limited to 
Sidumo’s outcome-based approach?’ available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=63b12c19-a56a-
4a12-8f31-9b05de51fff5  (accessed 28 October 2014). 
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3.2 REVIEWING CCMA AWARDS 
 
As noted, uncertainty arose on the interpretation and application of the narrow grounds of 
review. The LAC in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO. & Others231 and Shoprite Checkers 
(Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & Others232 tried to bring some clarity into the debate.233 The 
employees in Carephone were dismissed at the end of 1996, upon which they disputed their 
dismissal. An attempt at resolving the dispute led to an unsuccessful conciliation, the matter of 
which was then referred for arbitration, where it was ultimately determined that the employer 
had to pay compensation for the wrongful dismissal of the employees. The matter was then taken 
on review to the LC, where it was requested that the Court set aside the arbitration award on the 
basis that the Commissioner favoured the employees. The employer based its argument on the 
ground that the Commissioner did not want to grant a postponement of the matter on three 
occasions at the request of the employer. This resulted in the award being made while the 
employer was absent. The LC held that the facts were not sufficient to allow for a review under s 
145 of the LRA234 and that the Court did not have the power to allow appeals under s 158 of the 
LRA.235 The LC subsequently dismissed the review, but granted leave to appeal against the 
judgment to the LAC. The LAC confirmed that s 145 of the LRA is the correct section on which 
a party can rely to review an arbitration award as opposed to s 158(1)(g) of the LRA.236   
 
The Court in Carephone categorised the CCMA as an organ of state which exercises public 
power and functions when it resolves disputes in terms of the LRA.237  The Court further held 
that the Bill of Rights and the constitutional right to fair administrative action bind the CCMA 
when performing its functions under the LRA.238 The LAC acknowledges that administrative 
justice in terms of the Constitution has broadened the grounds of judicial review in 
                                                 
231 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO. & Others 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC). 
232 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & Others [2001] 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC) 
233 Van Niekerk A Law@work 3ed (2014) 461. 
234 Labour Relations Act No 66 of 1995. 
235 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO. & others 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) para 4. 
236 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO. & others 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) para 27. 
237 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO. & others 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) para 11. 
238 Van Niekerk A Law@work 3ed (2014) 461. 
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administrative actions.239 The constitutional provision requires the courts to ensure that 
administrative action is justifiable, to ensure that the outcomes of the decision made by the 
Commissioner are rational.240 The LAC was of the opinion that the ground of review should not 
be extended for the wrong reasons. Extending the ground of review by allowing the LC to 
interfere in conciliation and arbitration decisions made by the Commissioner is for the wrong 
reasons.241 Froneman DJP opined that a reviewing court must determine whether the 
administrative action is justifiable in terms of the reason given for it. The reviewing court will 
have to take into account the merits of the case, which threatens the distinction between appeal 
and review.242 Reviewing courts need to be mindful that they do not substitute their own opinion 
in the place of the Commissioner’s decision when taking the merits into account. They need to 
determine whether the outcome is rationally justifiable.243 This will ensure that the distinction 
between appeal and review is not blurred. Reviewing courts must determine whether there is a 
rational connection between the decision made and the material evidence available to the 
Commissioner to ensure that the decision is justifiable.244 
 
The judgment of Carephone was criticised by the Court in Ramdaw.245 Ms Ziqubu was 
employed by Shoprite Checkers as a part-time cashier. She had been employed for more or less 
five years. She was charged with gross misconduct by her employer as she had rung up an item 
for R2 as opposed to its real value of R20. She was found guilty in her disciplinary hearing and 
dismissed. Ms Ziqubu referred the dispute to the CCMA where the matter came before an 
arbitrator. The arbitrator concluded that the dismissal of Ms Ziqubu by Shoprite was a harsh 
sanction. The arbitrator ordered the reinstatement of Ms Ziqubu.246  
 
Shoprite applied to the LC to have the award reviewed and set aside. The Court rejected the 
decision in Carephone and held that the only grounds for review are those in s 145 of the 
                                                 
239 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO. & others 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) para 30. 
240 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO. & others 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) para 31. 
241 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO. & others 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) para 33. 
242 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO. & others 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) para 36. 
243 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO. & others 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) para 36. 
244 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO. & others 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) para 37. 
245 ‘Review of CCMA Arbitration Awards Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw No & Others’ (2001) 22 ILJ 
1516. 
246 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & Other  [2001] 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC) para 65. 
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LRA.247 The LC dismissed Shoprite’s appeal on the basis that the commissioner’s errors did not 
amount to a gross irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings. There were also no grounds for 
the Court to interfere with the award of the Commissioner in terms of s 145 of the LRA.248 
 
Shoprite once again appealed the matter to the LAC. The LAC held that the appeal raises the 
question of whether Carephone is good law.249 The Court concluded that when a CCMA 
commissioner makes an arbitration award, they are exercising public powers. The test for 
reviewing and setting aside such awards is on the ground of whether the award was rational.250 
The LAC held that justifiable and rational may not be synonymous, but that they bear a lot of 
similarity.251 The Court therefore equated rationality with justifiability. 
 
The LC and LAC continued to apply the test of review as set out in Carephone.252 They accepted 
that the power of review does not amount to an appeal, yet they were prepared to set arbitration 
awards aside on a wider range of circumstances. These circumstances included procedural 
irregularities on the part of an arbitrator, errors of law made by an arbitrator and failures by 
arbitrators to take into account relevant evidence in coming to their decisions.253 In certain cases 
these two courts were prepared to intervene if the arbitrator made a hasty decision and 
overturned the decisions of an employer to dismiss an employee.254 In certain circumstances the 
reviews were based on the specific provisions of s 145 of the LRA as interpreted by the test of 
rationality or justifiability.255  
 
3.3 THE TEST FOR REVIEW AS DETERMINED IN SIDUMO 
 
                                                 
247 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & Other (2000) 21 ILJ 1232 (LC) para 29. 
248 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & Other (2000) 21 ILJ 1232 (LC) para 31. 
249 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & Other  [2001] 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC) para 3. 
250 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & Other  [2001] 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC) para 20. 
251 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO & Other  [2001] 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC) para 25. 
252 Le Roux PAK & Leigh Young K ‘The role of reasonableness in dismissal: the Constitutional court looks at who 
has the final say’ (2007) 17 CLL 24. 
253 Le Roux PAK & Leigh Young K ‘The role of reasonableness in dismissal: the Constitutional court looks at who 
has the final say’ (2007) 17 CLL 24. 
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The CC in Sidumo attempted to address the issue of a correct standard for review. Sidumo, a 
security guard, was dismissed by Rustenburg Platinum Refineries after he was captured on 
videotape allowing employees to pass his check point without searching them. The matter was 
referred to the CCMA for arbitration. The Commissioner found that Sidumo was guilty of 
misconduct, but that the dismissal was too harsh a sanction based on his clean record and long 
service. The Commissioner ordered that Sidumo be reinstated subject to a final warning. The LC 
could not find any ground upon which to interfere with the award. The LC’s decision was based 
upon the grounds set out in s 145 of the LRA and the test in Carephone.256 The LAC was also 
critical of the Commissioner, but still agreed that, based upon Sidumo’s clean lengthy service 
record, dismissal was a harsh sanction, and dismissed the appeal accordingly. The LAC granted 
leave to appeal against the judgment to the SCA.  
 
The matter was appealed to the SCA, where the Court ruled that PAJA does apply to CCMA 
awards. The purpose of PAJA is to give effect to the ‘right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair’ as envisaged in s 33 of the Constitution.257 The discretion to 
dismiss an employee belongs to the employer. Such discretion must be exercised fairly and 
interference must be exercised with caution.258  The SCA was of the opinion that PAJA applied 
to reviews of CCMA awards and that PAJA superseded the LRA.259 The intention to reinstate 
Sidumo was not rationally connected to the information before the commissioner. The SCA 
upheld the decision to dismiss Sidumo and set aside the decision of the LAC.260 
 
On further appeal to the CC, Navsa AJ with the concurrence of four judges confirmed that the 
commissioner is exercising a public power when making an arbitration award. PAJA however 
does not apply to CCMA awards.261  
 
The majority followed the CC’s decision in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of 
Environmental Affairs & Tourism and Others262 to determine the appropriate test for review. The 
                                                 
256 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2007 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) para 25. 
257 Van Niekerk A Law@work 3ed (2014) 416. 
258 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2007 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) para 30. 
259 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2007 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) para 42. 
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CC in Bato Star had to determine the allocation of fishing quotas. Bato Star was dissatisfied with 
the allocation that they received for the 2002 - 2005 fishing seasons and as a result sought a 
review of the allocation. The matter was taken on review to the HC. The review was successful 
in the HC, but on appeal, the SCA overturned this judgment. The case raised the question: To 
what extent can a decision be susceptible to review under the new constitutional order?263 The 
Court in Bato Star held that an administrative award will be reviewable if it is one that a 
reasonable decision-maker could have reached.264 The determination of what constitutes a 
reasonable decision is one to be done on a case by case basis.265 The CC further held that the 
distinctions between appeal and review are significant and must be maintained even when the 
court is applying reasonableness when reviewing arbitration awards.266 The task of the reviewing 
court is to ensure that the decision taken by a commissioner falls within the ambit of 
reasonableness required by the Constitution.267 
 
In concurrence with three other judges, Ngcobo J (the minority judgment in Sidumo) held that 
CCMA arbitration awards do not amount to administrative action and that reviews are limited to 
the grounds set out in s 145(2) of the LRA.268 According to Ngcobo J the commissioner must 
afford both parties to the arbitration proceedings a fair hearing.269 When the LC accordingly 
reviews an award it must ensure that the commissioner has afforded both parties a fair trial.270 
 
When a reviewing court is reviewing an award it needs to determine whether the commissioner 
has committed an irregularity that has denied either party a fair hearing.271 This can be 
determined by the manner in which the hearing was conducted, the manner in which the 
                                                                                                                                                             
262 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 
(CC). 
263 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 
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264 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 
(CC) para 44. 
265 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 
(CC) para 45. 
266 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 
(CC) para 45. 
267 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 
(CC) para 45. 
268 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2007 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) para 88 and 163. 
269 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2007 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) para 88 and 267. 
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commissioner applied the evidence or the conclusion given by the commissioner derived from 
the evidence. Minor procedural irregularities or minor errors of reasoning do not constitute 
grounds for review if they do not materially prejudice a party.272 Where a procedural 
misdirection or an error of reasoning precludes a party from having a fair hearing, such conduct 
by the commissioner constitutes a gross irregularity as envisioned by s 145(2)(a)(ii) of the 
LRA.273 The LC is then permitted, and bound, to interfere when the conduct of the commissioner 
amounts to a gross irregularity.274 The effect of the Constitutional Court judgment in Sidumo was 
therefore to supposedly suffuse the requirement of reasonableness into the statutory review 
grounds.275 
 
3.4 LATENT IRREGULARITY AS A GROUND FOR REVIEWING ARBITRATION 
AWARDS 
 
‘Gross irregularity’ refers to two types of irregularity, namely, patent and latent irregularity. 
Patent irregularity derives from procedural irregularity, which is apparent from the records. 
Latent irregularity stems from the manner in which the decision-maker applied his or her 
mind.276 Both forms of irregularity challenge the objective of arbitration which is to afford both 
parties a fair trial on the issues in dispute.277 
 
With regards to latent irregularities one looks at the reasons to determine whether a gross 
irregularity had occurred in the proceedings as opposed to whether the result is correct.278 The 
reasoning of the decision-maker must not be confused with the conduct of the proceedings.279 
There is a distinction between the reasoning of the decision-maker and the conduct of the 
proceedings.  
                                                 
272 Grogan J Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution  (2010) 287. 
273 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 
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In three different judgments the LAC has set aside the arbitration award on the grounds of latent 
irregularity.280 These three judgments are Gaga,281 Afrox Health282 and Herholdt.283 In each of 
these cases the employees were dismissed for serious misconduct, but were reinstated in an 
arbitration award issued by the commissioner.   
 
In Gaga, the employee was employed as a Group Human Resources Manager. Gaga was 
dismissed on the ground of sexual harassment. He had harassed his personal assistant over a 
period of two years. Gaga successfully challenged his dismissal in arbitration proceedings. The 
matter was taken on review to the LC, where the company was successful in having the award 
reviewed. The matter was then appealed to the LAC. The LAC held that there is no rational basis 
justifying the commissioner’s conclusion. The commissioner disregarded relevant material 
evidence and focused too narrowly on whether the complainant had taken offence at the advance 
made by Gaga.284 The LAC held: 
 
‘Where a commissioner fails properly to apply his mind to material facts and unduly narrows 
the inquiry by incorrectly construing the scope of an applicable rule, he will not fully and 
fairly determines the case before him. The ensuing decision inevitably will be tainted by 
dialectical unreasonableness (process-related unreasonableness), characteristically resulting 
in a lack of rational connection between the decision and the evidence and most likely an 
unreasonable outcome (substantive unreasonableness). There will often be an overlap 
between the ground of review based on a failure to take into consideration a relevant factor 
and one based on the unreasonableness of a decision. If a commissioner does not take into 
account a factor that he is bound to take into account, his or her decision invariably will be 
unreasonable. The flaw in process alone will usually be sufficient to set aside the award on 
the grounds of it being a latent gross irregularity, permitting a review in terms of section 
145(1) read with section 145(2)(a)(ii) of the LRA.’285 
 
                                                 
280 Myburgh A ‘The LAC's Latest Trilogy of Review Judgments: Is the Sidumo Test in Decline?’ (2013) 34 ILJ 19  
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282 Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others (2012) 33 ILJ 1381 
(LAC); [2012] 7 BLLR 649 (LAC). 
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The Court in Gaga cited the dictum of Ngcobo J in Sidumo where he distinguishes between 
review on grounds of dialectical unreasonableness and substantive unreasonableness.286. In terms 
of the dictum, in order for fairness to be present in the proceedings it is required that a 
Commissioner take into consideration all the material evidence before him or her when 
determining the dispute. This was also cited in Afrox Healthcare and Herholdt.  
 
In Southern Sun Hotel (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others287 the Court held that process failure is 
sufficient to set an award aside. In the case, 36 individuals were charged with consumption of the 
company’s beverages and some of them were charged with consuming alcohol on duty. Thirty-
two individuals had a disciplinary hearing after three employees resigned and another admitted to 
the charges. Of the 32 employees only two were found not guilty, one was given a final warning 
and the remaining 29 were dismissed. Nineteen of the dismissed employees challenged the 
fairness of their dismissal. The dispute was referred to arbitration. The Commissioner made an 
award, wherein he found that the dismissals of the employees were procedurally fair, but 
substantively unfair based upon the company’s inconsistent conduct with regard to the 
disciplinary enquiry. The company applied to the LC to have the award reviewed based on the 
ground that the commissioner committed a gross irregularity. They argued that the commissioner 
had failed to apply his mind to a host of materially relevant considerations that arose from the 
evidence, and that he made material errors of law.  
 
The Court in Southern Sun Hotel held the following288: 
 
‘Section 145 of the LRA requires that the outcome of CCMA arbitration proceedings (as 
represented by the commissioner’s decision) must fall within a band of reasonableness, but 
this does not preclude this court from scrutinising the process in terms of which the decision 
was made. If a commissioner fails to take material evidence into account, or has regard to 
evidence that is irrelevant, or the commissioner commits some other misconduct or a gross 
irregularity during the proceedings under review and a party is likely to be prejudiced as a 
consequence, the commissioner’s decision is liable to be set aside regardless of the result of 
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the proceedings or whether on the basis of the record of the proceedings, that result is 
nonetheless capable of justification.’ 
 
The fact that the commissioner had erred in disallowing evidence of similar occurrences from 
being used in the arbitration constituted an irregularity which was sufficient to set aside the 
award. The Commissioner had failed to have regard to material facts and thereby hindered a full 
and fair determination of the issues.289  
 
In Afrox Healthcare the employee, a night shift nursing supervisor in the intensive care unit at a 
private hospital operated by Afrox Healthcare, was dismissed for negligence. He had failed to 
supervise an untrained staff member, Lehong, had failed to act in a responsible manner when 
deterioration of a patient’s condition was reported. The Commissioner in the arbitration found 
that the employee was not guilty of negligence during the arbitration and ordered the 
reinstatement of the employee. The matter was taken on review, but was dismissed by the LC. 
 
The LAC upheld the appeal of the company. The LAC held that the Commissioner had not given 
proper consideration to the material evidence before him and that he had failed to conduct a 
proper perusal of some critical aspects of the material which he had disregarded.290 The 
Commissioner’s conclusion was based largely on the fact that Lehong was not present to testify 
and thus the employer had failed to show that the employee was negligent.291 The Court further 
held that CCMA arbitration awards must ideally be crisp and to the point.292 However, this does 
not mean that material evidence which has a bearing on the conclusion of the commissioner must 
be ignored or left out of consideration.293 The Court concluded that the award made by the 
commissioner was not one that a reasonable decision-maker could not make.294 
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In Herholdt, the employee was employed as a financial planner by Nedbank. He was dismissed 
on the grounds of dishonesty by failing to disclose a conflict of interest arising from him being 
appointed as a beneficiary in the will of a client. He successfully challenged his dismissal in 
arbitration proceedings. The matter was taken on review to the LC. The LC upheld the review of 
the award and set it aside. The matter was then appealed to the LAC. The LAC dismissed the 
appeal against the judgment of the LC. The matter was once again appealed to the SCA. The 
issue before the Court in Herholdt was whether the test for review of CCMA awards determined 
in Sidumo is in decline.295 
 
The SCA in Herholdt was of the view that the confusion with regard to review of CCMA 
arbitration awards should have been clear after the Constitutional Court judgment in Sidumo.296 
Arbitration awards can now be bought before a reviewing court on the bases of 
unreasonableness, which was suffused with the grounds of review in s 145 of the LRA. Gross 
irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings in terms of s 145(2)(a)(ii) of the LRA, 
does not include the conduct of the commissioner where he or she has misconceived the nature 
of the enquiry.297 Where the result of the commissioner was unreasonable or the commissioner 
had misconceived the nature of the inquiry constitutes a gross irregularity.298  
 
The SCA in Herholdt stated that, when a reviewing court allows an award to be set aside on 
grounds of latent irregularities, it is lowering the threshold for interference with the award.299 It 
is also immaterial whether the conclusion reached by the commissioner has been reasonably 
reached based on the material before the Commissioner.300 This standard recognises that 
dialectical and substantive reasonableness are fundamentally interlinked, but that latent 
irregularity as a ground of review will cause an unreasonable substantive outcome.301 If the 
reviewing court is interfering based upon this ground, it will warrant the possibility of 
prejudice.302   
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The Court further held that the approach taken by the Labour Court on the notion of latent 
irregularity had originated in a dictum of the minority judgment of Ngcobo J in Sidumo.303 In his 
judgment Ngcobo J does not explain to what extend an oversight of the facts would warrant the 
award to be set aside.304 This dictum is contrary to the position endorsed by the majority 
judgment in Sidumo.305 All courts are bound by the majority judgment and therefore the notion 
of latent irregularity cannot be accepted as a ground to set aside an award by the labour courts.306 
It does not mean that a latent irregularity is not a gross irregularity within the ambit of s 
145(2)(a)(ii) of the LRA. Where the Commissioner has conducted the incorrect enquiry or 
conducted the proceedings incorrectly, which will constitute a latent irregularity.307 Material 
errors of fact, and the weight and relevance attached to the facts before the Commissioner, are 
not sufficient to set an award aside, except where the consequence of their effect renders the 
outcome unreasonable.308 
 
3.5 DIALECTIC UNREASONABLENESS AS COINED BY THE LABOUR APPEAL 
COURT 
 
Dialectic unreasonableness, also known as process related unreasonableness, originates from the 
process of reasoning of the arbitrator.309 When a reviewing court allows the setting aside of an 
arbitration award on the ground of process related unreasonableness, it is determining whether 
the process was reasonable in reaching the decision made by the commissioner.310 Dialectic 
unreasonableness is a term that was coined by the LAC based on the principal adapted by the CC 
in New Clicks.311 Substantive unreasonableness, also known as result based unreasonableness, is 
                                                 
303 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 18. 
304 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 19. 
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306 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 20. 
307 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 20. 
308 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 25. 
309 Rogers P & Naidu C ‘Test for review relooked – is there still scope for process related review or is it limited to 
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the test which was determined in the Constitutional Court judgment in Sidumo. The test requires 
the reviewing courts to determine whether the decision reached by the commissioner is one that a 
reasonable decision-maker could not have reached.312 When applying the result based test the 
reviewing court is testing the reasonableness of the decision made by the commissioner.313 
 
The Court in New Clicks dealt with the issue of review. The dispute arose out of regulations 
made by the Minister of Health which gives effect to the pricing system for the sale of 
medicines. The validity of these regulations was challenged in the HC, SCA and CC. The CC 
held that a decision-maker is bound to take into account all material evidence that is critical in 
reaching a reasonable decision.314 When a decision-maker disregards or fails to take into account 
material evidence which he or she had to take into consideration, the result can hardly be said to 
be that of a reasonable decision-maker.315 
 
The Court in Gaga held that when a commissioner fails to correctly apply his mind to material 
evidence and unjustifiably formulates a reason without the relevant material evidence, the 
commissioner will not be able to determine the dispute before him fully and fairly.316 The 
reasoning will unavoidably be tainted by dialectical unreasonableness which will result in a lack 
of rational connection between the decision and the evidence and most likely an unreasonable 
outcome.317 It is unavoidable for the overlap between the ground of review based on a failure to 
take into consideration a relevant factor and one that is based on the unreasonableness of a 
decision.318 When a commissioner disregards certain factors that he had to take into account, his 
or her decision will invariably be unreasonable. An error in the process alone will be sufficient to 
set aside the award on the ground of it being a latent gross irregularity, and to permit a review in 
terms of s 145(1) read with s 145(2)(a)(ii) of the LRA.319 Legal errors can lead to a 
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misinterpretation of the reasoning by the arbitrator and cause an irrational disconnection between 
the decision and the material evidence.320 
 
The Court in Samancor321 stated that an error is not in itself a proper basis for reconsidering an 
award.322 In Samancor the employee disputed the fairness of his dismissal and the dispute was 
referred to arbitration. Maloma was employed as a furnace operator by Samancor in August 
1996. Maloma was arrested on suspicion of robbery on 20 March 2006. Fourteen days after his 
arrest the charge was withdrawn, and he was released and returned to work. Later he was re-
charged for the same offence. He was then detained for a maximum of 140 days until he was 
released on bail. Ten days after his second arrest Samancor terminated his employment. There 
was no hearing before the termination, but a post-dismissal hearing was conducted after he was 
released. The arbitrator concluded that the termination was both substantively and procedurally 
unfair and ordered that he be reinstated. The matter was taken on review and the LC set aside the 
award. An appeal to the LAC was successful and Maloma was awarded compensation. The 
matter was once again appealed to the SCA. 
 
The SCA held that the LAC was incorrect in stating that the Commissioner should have 
determined whether the decision to terminate Maloma was fair, and manifestly fair.323 Had the 
award been subject to appeal this approach would have been correct, but the award is subject to 
review.324 It is common knowledge that an appeal is not allowed against an arbitration award.325 
Even if the reviewing court is of the opinion that the award was granted incorrectly, there are 
limited grounds upon which a reviewing court is entitled to interfere.326 Sidumo adopted the 
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approach taken in Carephone which allows the setting aside of an arbitration award if it is one a 
reasonable decision-maker could not have made.327  
 
The LAC in Herholdt expressed the view that the question before a reviewing court is whether 
the decision of the commissioner is valid even if it is not conclusive.328 The Court further held 
that all relevant material evidence and issues must be taken into account in order for the reason 
to be reasonable. In circumstances where a decision-maker fails to take into account all relevant 
factors which he or she had to take into account, the decision will not be reasonable in a 
dialectical sense.329 
 
One of the duties of a commissioner is to determine the material facts before him or her and to 
apply the provisions of the LRA to those facts in order to determine whether the dismissal was 
fair.330 Where a commissioner does not fairly arbitrate the points in dispute, the reasoning will be 
unreasonable.331 Whether the award or reasoning of a commissioner is reasonable, is irrelevant 
when determining objectively if he or she took all the relevant evidence into account.332 It is not 
necessary for the commissioner to have deprived the aggrieved party of a fair trial by 
misconceiving the point in dispute.333  
 
This threshold of interference is lower than the standard determined in the Constitutional Court 
judgment in Sidumo. This principle is sufficient to review an award where the commissioner has 
failed to apply his mind to relevant material facts or issues before him or her which will have the 
potential to prejudice.334 This approach is based upon the dictum of Ngcobo J(minority judgment 
of the Constitutional Court in Sidumo).335 This dictum expressly relates to the provisions of 
PAJA and the method by which they are to be applied.336 PAJA has no application to CCMA 
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awards and therefore does not apply to reviews under s 145(2) of the LRA.337 If reviewing courts 
interfere on the ground that the reasons of the commissioner are not such as to justify the award, 
they will be applying the decision of the SCA in Sidumo which was expressly overruled by the 
CC.338 Once again this is not a permissible development of the law.339 
 
 
3.6 THE TEST FOR REVIEW REASSESSED IN GOLD FIELDS MINING SA (PTY) 
LTD (KLOOF GOLD MINE V CCMA & OTHERS 
 
The courts were once again confronted with the issue of the review test in Gold Fields340 after 
the decision of the SCA in Herholdt. The SCA no longer has the jurisdiction to hear appeals 
from the LAC and the LAC now has the final say over appeals, except for constitutional issues in 
terms of the Constitutional Seventeenth Amendment Act, 2012.341 
 
The court in Gold Fields to a certain extend followed the approach adopted by the SCA in 
Herholdt.342 These two judgments are a comprehensive statement of the law on reviews based on 
latent gross irregularity and unreasonableness by the courts.343  
 
The LAC in Gold Fields had to determine whether the award made by the Commissioner was 
reviewable. In the case, an employee named Moreki was dismissed after being found guilty of 
serious neglect of his duty. Moreki was employed as a senior sampler. His duties were to take 
ore samples from measured plotted rock faces in Gold Fields’ underground mining operations 
according to the Stope and Development Sampling Standard. A discrepancy was found in 
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Moreki’s panels. Moreki disputed his dismissal which was referred to arbitration after 
conciliation. During arbitration the Commissioner found that Moreki was guilty of poor work 
performance, but held that the sanction of dismissal was too harsh and that the conduct of 
Moreki’s conduct could be corrected and improved. The Commissioner ordered that Moreki be 
reinstated without back pay.  
 
The matter was taken on review to the LC by Gold Fields. The LC dismissed the review 
application and held that the Commissioner had miscategorised the conduct of Moreki.344 The 
Commissioner’s decision that the sanction of dismissal was unfair is based on the reasonable 
decision-makers test determined in Sidumo.345 One of the grounds of appeal raised by Gold 
Fields is that the LC had miscategorised the review as a result based review and not as a process 
related review, and that the decision that the Court arrived at was incorrect.346 
 
The LAC in Herholdt held that awards can be reviewed on a process related ground which is a 
lesser standard to that which was determined in Sidumo.347 The LAC in Gold Fields disagreed 
with this approach. The Court held that Sidumo does not suggest that there is a test which 
requires a simple evaluation of the material evidence before the Commissioner and that based 
upon this evaluation courts can determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is 
reasonable.348 The LAC in Gold Fields further held that courts must determine whether the 
Commissioner’s decision is one which falls within the ambit of a decision made by a reasonable 
decision-maker on the basis of the material available to the Commissioner where the applicant 
alleges that a gross irregularity is present in the proceedings.349  
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The Court further held that gross irregularity is not a self-standing ground which is independent 
of the test determined in Sidumo.350 When courts allow awards to be reviewed on the ground that 
the Commissioner had failed to take material facts into account or took irrelevant facts into 
account, they are suggesting that there is an extended standard of review.351 There is no purpose 
for the reviewing court to consider and analyse every issue raised during arbitration, and then 
conclude that the arbitrator had failed to take into account all relevant material facts which 
allows the setting aside of the award.352 Process related irregularity as a ground of review is not 
sufficient in itself for interference by the reviewing court.353 Failure to have regard to material 
facts defeats the constitutional imperative which requires the award to be rational and 
reasonable.354 
 
In essence an applicant must be able to establish one of the listed grounds to be present and that 
the decision reached by the Commissioner is unreasonable.355 The LAC in Gold Fields was of 
the opinion that reasonableness is an additional test. This approach is at odds with what was 
found by the SCA in Herholdt. The SCA in Herholdt held that an applicant can have an award 
reviewed on the listed grounds set out in s 145 of the LRA in addition to unreasonableness as a 
ground. This is what the CC in Sidumo meant when it held that s 145 of the LRA is suffused by 
reasonableness. 
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3.7 THE CANADIAN STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Before Dunsmuir the courts in Canada recognised three standards of review,356 namely patent 
unreasonableness, reasonable simpliciter, and correctness.357 The appropriate standard of review 
in a particular case is determined on the basis of a pragmatic and functional analysis. When 
applying the pragmatic and functional analysis in determining the appropriate standard of 
review, reviewing courts must take into account a range of factors, such as, the existence of a 
privative clause; the nature of the issue in question, and the expertise of the tribunal.358 The 
Court in Dunsmuir noted that the existing law was unsatisfactory.359 
 
The appellant in Dunsmuir was employed by the Department of Justice for the Province of New 
Brunswick. His probation was extended twice and the employer reprimanded him on three 
separate occasions during his employment period. A formal letter of reprimand was given to 
Dunsmuir warning him that if his work performance did not improve then disciplinary action 
would be taken which could result in dismissal. A formal letter of termination was delivered to 
his lawyer as his employer was of the opinion that he was not suited for the position. A grievance 
was denied and then referred to adjudication under New Brunswick’s Public Service Labour 
Relation Act.360 The adjudicator stated that the termination was void ab initio. This was on the 
basis that Dunsmuir was entitled to procedural fairness in the employer’s decision to terminate 
him and did not receive it.361 The adjudicator ordered that Dunsmuir must be reinstated as of the 
date of dismissal. The adjudicator further held that in the event that Dunsmuir’s reinstatement 
                                                 
356 Salans, Fraser Milner Casgrain and SNR Denton ‘Supreme Court of Canada Rewrites Law on Standard of  
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order is quashed on judicial review, he would find that the appropriate notice period ought to be 
eight months.362 
 
The matter was taken on judicial review. The Court held that the adjudicator did not have 
jurisdiction to inquire into the reasons for the termination and that he was only allowed to 
determine whether the notice period was reasonable.363 The Court held that Dunsmuir had 
received procedural fairness by virtue of the grievance that was held before the adjudicator. 
Applying the reasonable simpliciter standard, the reviewing court set aside the adjudicator’s 
decision regarding Dunsmuir’s reinstatement, but upheld the adjudicator’s provisional award of 
eight months’ notice.364 
 
The matter was taken on appeal to the New Brunswick Court of Appeal. The Court held that the 
correct standard of review was reasonableness simpliciter and not correctness. The Court further 
held that the adjudicator’s decision was unreasonable.365 The majority of the Court held that the 
judicial review system in Canada had proven to be difficult to apply, and reconsidered both the 
number and definitions of the various standards of review. It held that there should only be two 
standards of review: correctness and reasonableness.366 
 
The correctness standard will apply to jurisdictional issues and where the question of law is in 
dispute.  The reviewing court will look at the case afresh and determine whether it agrees with 
the decision of the adjudicator.367 If the reviewing court does not agree with the decision made 
by the adjudicator, it will substitute its own view and determine the correct decision.368 In 
essence the court needs to determine whether the decision of the adjudicator is correct.369 This is 
similar to an appeal procedure which a grievance party cannot use as a remedy to review an 
arbitration award in South African courts. When reviewing a matter on appeal courts must decide 
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whether the decision of the court a quo was right or wrong370 which will have to be decided on 
whether the decision was right or wrong on the facts or the law.371 The Court in Samancor held 
that even if the reviewing court does not agree with the decision of the commissioner it does not 
grant the court the opportunity to substitute its own opinion. There are limited grounds upon 
which a reviewing court is entitled to interfere in terms of s145 of the LRA.372 
 
In contrast to the correctness standard, when a reviewing court applies the standard of 
reasonableness it will have to analysis the qualities that make a decision reasonable.373 The court 
will have to look at the process in reaching the decision, as well as the outcomes of the decision 
of the adjudicator.374 When applying the standard of reasonableness the reviewing court is 
concerned with justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process, 
whether the decision is reasonable and can be justified on the facts and in law.375 The standard of 
review determined by the CC in Sidumo is the reasonable standard of review test. This test 
requires the reviewing court to determine whether the decision reached by the commissioner is 
reasonable. The reviewing court must take into consideration the reasons provided by the 
commissioner and the material evidence which was before the commissioner. ‘There must be a 
reasonably sustainable fit between the evidence and the outcome.’376 The focus is largely on the 
outcome of the decision, as opposed to the manner in which the commissioner had arrived at the 
decision.377  
 
The standard of reasonableness as determined in Dunsmuir is not similar to the reasonable 
decision-makers test as determined in Sidumo. The reviewing court in Sidumo is not concerned 
on whether the process in reaching the decision is reasonable. The outcomes of the decision 
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made by the Commissioner must be reasonable. The Court in Dunsmuir held that a reviewing 
court must be concerned with justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-
making process. The reviewing court will have to determine whether the reasoning of the 
adjudicator is reasonable. In order to determine whether the decision made by the adjudicator is 
reasonable the reviewing court will have to look at the process of articulating the reasons and the 
outcomes of the decision made by the adjudicator.378 In essence the reviewing court needs to 
determine whether the process in reaching the decision is reasonable. 
 
 
 
3.8 COMPARISION WITH NAMIBIA’S JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEDURE 
 
As previously stated, the LRA does not allow a right of appeal against an arbitration award. The 
drafters of the LRA intentionally rejected the possibility of an appeal.379 They believed that the 
exclusion of an appeal against the arbitrator’s award would speed up the process and free it from 
the legalism and costs that accompany appeal proceedings.380 Inherent delays in finalising 
disputes are common in both the South African and Namibian court systems, which is contrary to 
the objectives of labour legislation.381  
 
The delays in finalising disputes did not stop Namibia from permitting an aggrieved party the 
choice between an appeal against or a review of arbitration proceedings, as opposed to the 
position in South Africa.382 Appeals in Namibia are permitted on the basis of art 12(1)(a) of the 
Namibian Constitution,383 which ensures that parties to arbitration proceedings are guaranteed a 
right to a fair trial.384 Arbitration proceedings are considered to be a forum for the purpose of 
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resolving labour disputes. In South Africa, the CCMA is an administrative body as defined in s 
33 of the Constitution.385 
 
Appeals against arbitration proceedings can only be done on limited grounds. They can be done 
based on any question of law, of fact, or of a combination of both. 386 In Shoprite Namibia the 
appellant appealed on question of law against the arbitrator’s award. The appellant was of the 
opinion that the arbitrator had erred on the law or on the facts in her finding of the material 
evidence. The Court held that s 89 (1)(a) of the Nambian Labour Act permits a court to hear an 
appeal on a question of law alone where the matter does not fall within the ambit of s 89(1)(b) of 
the Labour Act. Section 89 (1)(b) states that a party to a dispute may appeal to the Labour Court 
against an arbitrator’s award, where an award in a dispute was initially referred to the Labour 
Commissioner on a question of fact, law or mixed fact and law. In essence the court cannot hear 
an appeal on a question of fact or both law and fact.387  
 
The Court in JB Cooling & Refrigeration388 reaffirmed that when an arbitration award is 
appealed against in terms of s 86(1)(a) of the Labour Act389, but does not fall within the ambit of 
s 86(1)(b), such appeal must be on a question of law alone.390 In order for a court to determine 
whether the appeal is on a question of law or fact, the reviewing Court will have to determine 
whether the LAC made the correct decision and order. In order for a court to determine that the 
decision made by the arbitrator is the correct one, it will first have to establish the facts which 
were common cause or not in issue before the arbitrator and then determine the relevant findings 
that arbitrator made.391  
 
An arbitration award may be reviewed where the aggrieved party alleges a defect in the 
arbitration proceedings.392 In terms of s 89(5) of the Labour Act393, an award can be set aside on 
                                                 
385 Musukubili F & van der Walt ‘The Namibian Labour Dispute Resolution System: Some Lessons from South 
Africa’ (2014) 35(1) Obiter 133. 
386 Section 89(1)(a) and (b) of the Labour Act 11 of 2007 (Labour Act). 
387 Shoprite Namibia (Pty) Ltd v Paulo and Another (LCA 02/2010) [2011] NALC 5 para 2. 
388 JB Cooling & Refrigeration CC v Kavendjaa & Others (LCA 15/2010) [2012] NALC 8. 
389 Labour Act 11 of 2007 
390 JB Cooling & Refrigeration CC v Kavendjaa & Others (LCA 15/2010) [2012] NALC 8 para 6. 
391 JB Cooling & Refrigeration CC v Kavendjaa & Others (LCA 15/2010) [2012] NALC 8 para 11. 
392 Section 89(4) of the Labour Act. 
393 Labour Act 11 of 2007 
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the grounds of misconduct, gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings, that 
the commissioner exceeded his/her power, or that award has been improperly obtained. These 
grounds are similar to the grounds set out in s 145(2) of the LRA394. 
 
 In Atlantic Chicken395 the applicant had brought a decision on review and fought to have it set 
aside. The LAC held that a review does not allow the court to reconsider the award made by the 
arbitrator.396 A judicial review is concerned with the decision-making process as opposed to the 
arbitrator’s decision.397 In essence the applicant’s grievance must be against the procedure 
followed during the arbitration proceedings.398 This is similar to process related 
unreasonableness. The reviewing court will have to determine whether the process followed by 
the commissioner in reaching the decision was reasonable. This generous approach allowed by 
the LAC in Herholdt was rejected by the SCA in Herholdt. The SCA held that an award can be 
reviewed on the grounds set out in s 145 of the LRA which is suffused with the standard of 
reasonableness as determined in Sidumo. The Court in Atlantic Chicken held that awards can 
only be reviewed on the grounds set out in s 89(4) of the Labour Act399, but the grievance party 
needs to prove that there was a defect in the process during the arbitration.400 
 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
 
Arbitration awards can only be reviewed in exceptional cases.401 The aim of the legislature was 
to ensure that CCMA awards would be final and only be interfered with in limited 
circumstances.402 The narrow grounds of review ensure that parties are bound to the finding of 
the commissioner even if the commissioner has erred on the facts or the law.403 
 
                                                 
394 Labour Act 11 of 2007 
395 Atlantic Chicken Company (Pty) Ltd v Mwandingi & Other (LC 105/2011) [2012] NALC 11. 
396 Atlantic Chicken Company (Pty) Ltd v Mwandingi & Other (LC 105/2011) [2012] NALC 11 para 5. 
397 Atlantic Chicken Company (Pty) Ltd v Mwandingi & Other (LC 105/2011) [2012] NALC 11 para 5. 
398 Atlantic Chicken Company (Pty) Ltd v Mwandingi & Other (LC 105/2011) [2012] NALC 11 para 5. 
399 Labour Act 11 of 2007 
400 Atlantic Chicken Company (Pty) Ltd v Mwandingi & Other (LC 105/2011) [2012] NALC 11 para 5. 
401 Du Toit D et al Labour Relations Law 5 ed (2006) 198. 
402 Du Toit D et al Labour Relations Law 5 ed (2006) 198. 
403 Du Toit D et al Labour Relations Law 5 ed (2006) 198. 
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A reviewing court can only interfere with an arbitration award if the conduct of the 
commissioner amounts to gross irregularity. The conduct will only amount to gross irregularity 
where the commissioner had not afforded either party the opportunity of a fair trial. This will 
ensure that the decision made by the commissioner is reasonable and without procedural errors 
or poor reasoning, unless the commissioner misunderstood the issue before him or her.404 
Inadequate reasoning or failure to take into account all relevant factors will not make the 
commissioner’s decision unreasonable.405 This portrays that errors of law and fact are not 
important, yet these errors are in certain circumstances very important.406 These errors determine 
whether the award is substantively unreasonable or not. 
 
In the following chapter, concluding remarks will be made in respect to whether the standard of 
review determined in Sidumo is an appropriate mechanism for reviewing arbitral awards and whether 
the distinction between review and appeal is threatened.  
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405 Fergus E ‘Reviewing an Appeal: A response to Judge Murphy and the SCA’ (2014) 35 ILJ 47-59. 
406 Fergus E ‘Reviewing an Appeal: A response to Judge Murphy and the SCA’ (2014) 35 ILJ 47-59. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this thesis was to determine whether the standard of reasonableness as expressed by 
the Constitutional Court in Sidumo is an appropriate mechanism for reviewing arbitrational 
awards. S 33(1) of the Constitution407 requires that administrative action must be ‘reasonable’.408 
In order to determine whether a decision made by the Commissioner is reasonable or 
unreasonable is often thought to be an incurably substantive undertaking. There is a fear that 
courts will be drawn into the merits of the decision made by the Commissioner, which blurs the 
distinction between appeal and review.409 
 
It is submitted that reviewing an arbitration award on the grounds of reasonableness does 
threaten the distinction between appeal and review, but to a limited extent where it is necessary 
for the court to scrutinise the merits of the Commissioner’s decision.410 It is impossible to 
determine whether a decision falls within the ambit of reasonableness without taking into 
consideration the material evidence before the Commissioner, with emphasis placed on various 
factors, inclusive of the purpose the decision sought to achieve. 411 The distinction between 
appeal and review can be best explained by distinguishing between review as a process and a 
remedy.412 In the process of review, a reviewing court can scrutinise the arbitration award – but 
not to the extent where the court sets aside a commissioner’s decision with which it does not 
agree.413 The Court in Bato Star recognised this danger.414 A reviewing court must determine 
whether or not the decision of a Commissioner falls within the ambit of reasonableness as 
determined in Sidumo.415 
                                                 
407 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
408 Hoexter G Administration Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 327. 
409 Hoexter G Administration Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 327. 
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412 Hoexter G Administration Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 352. 
413 Hoexter G Administration Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 352. 
414 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 
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415 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 
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An award made by a Commissioner will be unreasonable if it could not have been reached by a 
reasonable decision-maker as determined by the Constitutional Court in Sidumo.  
 
The Courts in Herholdt and Gold Fields ‘only dealt with latent irregularity and unreasonableness 
in the context of factual findings made by Commissioners in relation to the issue of guilt.’416 
These two judgments have no bearings on reviews based on patent irregularity or error of law.417 
The SCA in Herholdt had to determine whether the LAC was correct in developing the test of 
review and extending the grounds to permit reviews based on latent gross irregularity which is a 
lesser standard than the standard determined in Sidumo.  
 
Herholdt and Gold Fields do not prevent courts the opportunity to review process-related 
reviews, but both the SCA and the LAC held that it will not be sufficient enough to set an award 
aside on such a ground.418 According to the SCA in Herholdt courts can review awards on the 
grounds set out in s 145 of the LRA and on the ground of reasonableness. This approach 
reaffirms the decision made by the CC in Sidumo that s 145 of the LRA419 is suffused with 
reasonableness. The LAC in Gold Fields held that awards can be reviewed on the grounds set out 
in s 145 of the LRA, with unreasonableness as an additional requirement. This approach conflicts 
with the approach taken by the CC in Sidumo. The Courts in both cases held that the awards had 
failed the Sidumo test and therefore cannot be set aside. In essence an unhappy party must be 
able to prove that the award was unreasonable in order for the award to be set aside. 
 
In Sidumo, Ngcobo J held that it is required of a commissioner to apply his/her mind to the issues 
that are material to the determination of the dispute in order for the proceedings to be fair.420 
This dictum was endorsed by the LAC in Herholdt, Gaga and Afrox Health. Both the SCA and 
                                                 
416 Myburgh A ‘The test for review of CCMA arbitration awards: an update’ (2013) 23(4) Contemporary Labour 
Law 40. 
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418 Myburgh A ‘The test for review of CCMA arbitration awards: an update’ (2013) 23(4)  Contemporary Labour 
Law 42. 
419 Labour Relations Act No 66 of 1995. 
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the LAC in Herholdt and Gold Fields either expressly or implicitly rejected the dictum of 
Ngcobo. The Courts in both Herholdt and Gold Fields held that an applicant will only succeed 
with a review based on the Commissioner’s failure to consider material facts, where the 
applicant can establish that this resulted in the award being substantively unreasonable and 
failing the Sidumo test.421  
 
The SCA in Herholdt was critical of the dictum in two respects. The SCA held that the dictum is 
in conflict with the historical meaning of a gross irregularity.422 The SCA further held that the 
dictum was in conflict with the approach endorsed by the majority judgment by the CC in 
Sidumo. The LAC in Gold Fields does not discuss the dictum of Ngcobo J. However the LAC in 
Gold Fields implicitly rejects the dictum of Ngcobo J. The Court held that where an applicant 
alleges gross irregularity in the proceedings, courts must determine whether the award is 
unreasonable. This approach conflicts with Ngcobo J’s dictum which allows courts to review 
awards based on the ground of gross irregularity irrespective of whether the result was 
reasonable.423 
 
When courts are determining whether the Sidumo test has been met, they should not focus on the 
errors committed by the Commissioner. Instead the court should holistically analyse all the 
material evidence that was before the Commissioner in order to determine whether the result of 
the award is capable of reasonable justification. There are those who contend that after the 
judgment of Herholdt and Gold Fields, succeeding on review will be more difficult.424 
Consideration needs to be taken into account on the fact that the LAC after Sidumo has set aside 
awards or confirmed the setting aside on review in numerous judgments on the basis of process-
                                                 
421 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 25. See also Gold Fields (JA 2/2012) 
[2013] ZALAC 28 para 15. 
422 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd and Another (701/2012) [2013] ZASCA 97 para 19. See also Myburgh A ‘The test for 
review of CCMA arbitration awards: an update’ (2013) 23 Contemporary Labour Law 4 35. 
423 Sidumo & another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd & others 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 para 
267. 
424 Myburgh A ‘The test for review of CCMA arbitration awards: an update’ (2013) 23(4) Contemporary Labour 
Law 42. See also Rogers P & Naidu C ‘Test for review relooked – is there still scope for process related review or is 
it limited to Sidumo’s outcome-based approach?’ http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=63b12c19-a56a-
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related unreasonableness.425 The arbitration awards in these cases had failed the Sidumo test. The 
LAC in Herholdt held that process-related errors are sufficient to have an award set aside 
without the Sidumo test being met.426 An arbitration award will only be unreasonable if it is one 
that a reasonable arbitrator could not reach on all the material before them as was determined in 
Sidumo.427 Courts cannot simply set aside an award on (even material) errors of fact, including 
the weight and relevance attached to particular facts, unless the outcome is unreasonable.428 
 
In Herholdt and Gold Fields the SCA and LAC concluded that the Commissioner’s award was 
unreasonable. The Commissioner in both cases held that the employees were guilty of 
misconduct and that dismissal was a fair sanction. The SCA and LAC held that the awards had 
failed the Sidumo test. Seemingly there has been a development in a different direction with 
regards to the review standard, which allows courts to set aside an award on the grounds of a 
latent irregularity as opposed to gross irregularity. Accordingly, if courts can determine on 
review that the outcome of an award was objectively wrong, an award will more often than not 
be set aside on the ground of unreasonableness.429 
 
In conclusion, both courts where correct in stating that the awards had failed the Sidumo test as 
this was the standard determined by the CC in Sidumo. The LAC was incorrect in allowing 
awards to be set aside on the ground of latent irregularity. The LAC did not recognise the 
majority judgment of the CC in Sidumo which is binding on all lower courts including the SCA. 
In essence the LAC was incorrect in extending the grounds of review, to allow arbitration awards 
to be set aside on the ground of latent gross irregularity. Therefore the standard of reasonableness 
as determined by the Constitutional Court in Sidumo is an appropriate mechanism for reviewing 
arbitrational awards. 
Word Count: 26 183 words 
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